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Abstract
Network survivability is an attribute that network is continually available even
if a communication failure occurs, and is an emerging requirement for highly re-
liable communication services in wireless ad hoc networks (WAHNs) and mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs). Moreover, quantitative network survivability is
dened as the probability that the network can keep to be connected even under
node failures and DoS attacks, and known as one of the most important mea-
sures to design dependable computer networks. Markov modeling is a typical
method to quantifying network survivability. On the other hand, border eect
in communication network area is also one of the most troublesome problems to
quantify accurately the performance/dependability of WAHNs/MANETs, be-
cause the assumption on uniformity of network node density is often unrealistic
to describe the actual communication area. This problem appears in modeling
the node behavior of WAHNs/MANETs and in quantication of their network
survivability. This fact motivates us to reformulate the existing network surviv-
ability models for WAHNs/MANETs by taking account of border eects.
In this thesis, we propose three node behavior models and consider two types
network communication areas. We analysis these network survivability models
by semi-Markov process (SMP) and Markov regenerative process (MRGP). Also,
we develop a simulation model to validate our analytical models.
In Chapter 1, we introduce the denition of network survivability, impor-
tance of network survivability quantication and motivation of our study.
In Chapter 2, we propose two stochastic models; binomial model and neg-
ative binomial model to quantify the network survivability and compare them
with the existing Poisson model. Then, we focus on the border eects, and
reformulate the network survivability models based on a SMP, where two kinds
of communication network areas are considered; square area and circular area.
Based on some geometric ideas, we improve the quantitative network surviv-
ability measures for three stochastic models (Poisson, binomial and negative
binomial) taking account of border eects.
In Chapter 3, we concern the fact that the continuous-time Markov chain
(CTMC) modeling is not sucient to analyze the relationship between battery
state and node behavior in MANETs. In particular, such a problem seriously
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arises when we treat the transient behavior of the power-aware MANET. Here,
we present the quantitative network survivability analysis for a power-aware
MANET based on MRGP, and calculate the network survivability through both
stationary and transient analyses for the SMP-based models.
In Chapter 4, we derive analytically the upper and lower bounds of network
survivability as well as an approximate form based on the expected number of
active nodes in both square and circular areas, under a general assumption that
the battery life in each node is non-exponentially distributed. We perform the
transient analysis as well as the steady-state analysis of network survivability
based on a SMP, and complement the results in Chapter 3.
We propose some analytical formulas on the quantitative network surviv-
ability in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, but need to validate them by
comparing with the exact value of network survivability in a comprehensive way.
In Chapter 5, we revisit the lower and upper bounds of network survivability by
taking account of border eects in network communication areas, and develop a
rened simulation model in two kinds of communication areas; square area and
circular area. We compare the analytical bounds of network survivability with
the simulation solution. It is shown through simulation experiments that the
analytical solutions often fail the exact network survivability measurement.
Finally, some conclusions and remarks are given in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Network survivability is an attribute that network is continually available even
if a communication failure occurs, and is an emerging requirement for highly
reliable communication services in WAHNs and MANETs. Moreover, it has
been dened as the probability that the network can keep to be connected even
under node failures and DoS attacks, and known as one of the most important
concepts to design dependable computer networks. Markov modeling is a typical
method for the network survivability performance evaluation.
On the other hand, border eect in communication network area is one of the
most important problems to quantify accurately the performance/dependability
of WAHNs/MANETs, because the assumption on uniformity of network node
density is often unrealistic to describe the actual communication area. This
problem appears in modeling the node behavior of WAHNs/MANETs and in
quantication of their network survivability. In this thesis, we evaluate network
survivability in three steps; formulation of border eects, node behavior analysis
and simulation experiments.
1.1 Survivability Analysis with Border Eects
Network survivability is regarded as the most fundamental issue to design re-
silient networks. Since unstructured networks such as P2P network and MANET
can change dynamically their congurations, the survivability requirement for
unstructured networks is becoming much more popular than static networks.
Network survivability is dened by various authors [1, 2, 3, 4]. Chen et al. [5],
Cloth and Haverkort [6], Heegaard and Trivedi [7], Liu et al. [8], Liu and Trivedi
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[9] consider the survivability of virtual connections in telecommunication net-
works and dene the quantitative survivability measures related to performance
metrics like the loss probability and the delay distribution of non-lost packets.
Their survivability measures are analytically tractable and depend on the per-
formance modeling under consideration, where the transition behavior has to
be described by a CTMC or a stochastic Petri net. More recently, Zheng et al.
[10] conduct a survivability analysis for virtual machine-based intrusion tolerant
systems, and take the similar approach to the works [1, 2, 3, 4].
On the other hand, Xing and Wang [11, 12] perceive the survivability of a
MANET as the probabilistic k-connectivity, and provide a quantitative analysis
on impacts of both node misbehavior and failure. They approximately derive
the lower and upper bounds of network survivability based on k-connectivity,
which implies that every node pair in a network can communicate with at least
k neighbors. On the probabilistic k-connectivity, signicant research works are
done in [13, 14] to build the node degree distribution models. Unfortunately,
the resulting upper and lower bounds are not always tight to characterize the
connectivity-based network survivability, so that a rened measure of network
survivability should be dened for analysis. Roughly speaking, the connectivity-
based network survivability analysis in [11, 12] focuses on the path behavior and
can be regarded as a myopic approach to quantify the survivability attribute.
The performance-based network survivability analysis in [1, 2, 3, 4] is, on the
other hand, a black-box approach to describe the whole state changes. Although
both approaches possess advantage and disadvantage, in this thesis we concern
only the former case.
We develop somewhat dierent stochastic models from Xing and Wang
[11, 12] by introducing dierent degree distributions. More specically, they
propose binomial and negative binomial models in addition to the familiar Pois-
son model, under the assumption that mobile nodes are uniformly distributed.
We also extend the semi-Markov model to a Markov regenerative process model
and deal with a generalized stochastic model to describe a power-ware MANET.
However, it should be noted that the above network survivability models are
based on multiple unrealistic assumptions to treat an ideal communication net-
work environment. One of them is ignorance of border eects arising to represent
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network connectivity. In typical MANETs such as sensor networks, it is com-
mon to assume that each node is uniformly distributed in a given communication
network area. Since the shape of communication network area is arbitrary in
real world, it is not always guaranteed that the node degree is identical even
in the border of network area. In other words, border eects in communication
network area tend to decrease both the communication coverage and the node
degree, which reect the whole network availability. Laranjeira and Rodrigues
[17] show that the relative average node degree for nodes in borders is indepen-
dent of the node transmission range and of the overall network node density
in a square communication network area. Bettsetetter [18] also gives a mathe-
matical formula to calculate the average node degree for nodes in borders for a
circular communication network area. However, these works just concern to in-
vestigate the connectivity of a wireless sensor network, but not the quantitative
survivability evaluation for MANETs. This fact motivates us to reformulate the
existing network survivability models [11, 12] for MANETs with border eects.
1.2 Survivability Analysis for MANETs
Since unstructured networks such as P2P and MANETs dynamically change
their conguration, they require the higher network survivability than static
networks. One important problem on mobile network is to reduce the energy
consumption of mobile nodes. As we know, in the power-aware wireless ad hoc
network, the energy consumption problem of a node can cause the communi-
cation barrier which reects the whole network dependability and performance.
We investigate the relationship between energy consumption and security based
on a CTMC. More specically we suppose that two power consumption levels
(high and low) alternate randomly, and that its transition behavior is described
by a simple CTMC where all state transitions follow exponential distributions.
In addition to the energy consumption level, our model represent the behavior
of malicious attacks such as DoS attacks, and analyze the dynamic behavior of
power-aware wireless ad hoc network to quantify the network survivability as
the probabilistic k-connectivity. However, in general, the battery life distribu-
tion cannot be represented by an exponential distribution [20]. In other words,
the CTMC model is too simple to investigate the eect of battery life on the
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network survivability. This motivates us to revisit the network survivability
analysis for power-aware MANETs.
1.3 Survivability Analysis with Battery Charge
There exist a number of challenging issues to provide big data services in ubiq-
uitous circumstance. The drastic improvement of network performance is de-
nitely needed to process a large amount of data, especially, in the system level.
On the other hand, it is important to keep the high service level on the big data
stream and evaluate the network dependability in the design phase to develop
highly dependable ubiquitous network systems. Network survivability is dened
as an attribute that network is continually available even though a communi-
cation failure occurs, and is regarded as the most fundamental issue to design
resilient communication networks. Since unstructured networks, such as P2P
network and MANET, can change dynamically their congurations, the surviv-
ability requirement for unstructured networks is becoming much more popular
than static networks. In the near future, it is expected that this trend may be
accelerated even in the big data service. Although quantitative network sur-
vivability is dened by various authors [1, 2, 5], it is still a challenging issue
from the complex and autonomous properties of unstructured networks. Xing
and Wang [12] perceive the survivability of a wireless ad hoc network as the
probabilistic k-connectivity [13, 14, 18], and provide a quantitative analysis on
impacts of both node misbehavior and failure. They approximately derive the
lower and upper bounds of network survivability based on k-connectivity, which
implies that every node pair in the network can communicate with at least k
neighbors. Unfortunately, the upper and lower bounds of network survivability
in [12] are not always tight to quantify the network survivability. We are moti-
vated by the above fact and extend the seminal model [12] by introducing the
compound distributions of Poisson model.
We evaluate a power-aware MANET by using a MRGP and investigate an
eect of variability in power level, which is caused by the low-battery state in
each node, but does not consider the possible case where the battery in each
mobile node can be re-charged at the lower battery state in their MRGP mod-
eling framework. In addition, We implicitly assume that the so-called border
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eects can be ignored in their modeling. It is well known that the shape of
communication area with border eects strongly depends on the network prop-
erties. Laranjeira and Rodrigues [17] develop a geometry analysis to quantify
the network connectivity, and rene the reliability assurance of wireless sen-
sor networks. More specically, it is common to assume in the network analysis
that the communication node is uniformly distributed in an ideal communication
area. Since the border eects in network communication areas tend to decrease
both the communication coverage and the node degree, they must reect the
whole network survivability including availability and reliability. Laranjeira and
Rodrigues [17] show that the relative average node degree for nodes in borders
is independent of the node transmission range and of the overall network node
density in a square communication area.
Most recently, We revisit a power-aware MANET model in Xing and Wang
[12] taking account of both border eects and the possibility of re-charge, and
quantify the network survivability more accurately. We suppose that each node
state is modulated by a semi-Markov process and that the node density in an
arbitrary communication area is given by a simple Poisson model, where two
types of communication areas are considered; square area [17] and circular area
[18].
1.4 A Simulation Approach to Qunatify Surviv-
ability
Finally, we develop a simulation model to quantify the network survivability
accurately. In past, several simulation models have been proposed in the litera-
ture to quantify network connectivity or to detect survival routes in MANETs
(see Caro et al. [21] and Guo [22]). To our best knowledge, an exact simulation
model to quantify the network survivability based on connectivity [11, 12] has
not been proposed yet. It is denitely needed to check the resulting quantitative
survivability based on the analytical approaches by comparing with the simula-
tion solution. It is indeed signicant to point out that the analytical solutions in
the literature [11, 12] have not been validated in comparison with the simulation
solution because of its complexity.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.5 Organization of Dissertation
This thesis is organized as follows:
Firstly, in Chapter 2, we propose two stochastic models; binomial model
and negative binomial model to quantify the network survivability and compare
them with the existing Poisson model, and propose rened measures for network
survivability taking account of the expected number of active nodes and border
eects in MANETs. More specically, we represent an approximate form of
connectivity-based network survivability with the expected number of active
nodes, instead of its upper and lower bounds [11, 12], and consider border
eects in both two types of communication network areas; square area [17] and
circular area [18].
In Chapter 3, we consider MRGP for the node behavior. The MRGP con-
sists of several discrete states and time sequence of state transition, and is an
extension from CTMC and renewal process. When the transition of power
states follow general distributions, the model should be described by an MRGP.
Particularly, this chapter focuses on both stationary and transient analysis of
network survivability based on our MRGP model for power-aware MANETs.
In Chapter 4, we further extend the result of Chapter 3 for the other stochas-
tic models including a binomial model and a negative binomial model. We derive
analytically the upper and lower bounds of network survivability [12] as well as
an approximate form based on the expected number of active nodes in both
square [17] and circular [18] areas, under a general assumption that the battery
life in each node is non-exponentially distributed. Also, we perform the tran-
sient analysis as well as the steady-state analysis of network survivability, and
complements our early paper.
In Chapter 5, we propose a simulation algorithm to calculate the exact net-
work survivability in two types communication areas. Numerical examples are
also given, where we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation on the node degree and
investigate the impact of border eects.
Finally, the thesis is concluded with some remarks and future directions in
Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Survivability Analysis with
Border Eects for MANETs
Taking account of border eects in communication network areas is one of the
most important problems to quantify accurately the performance/dependability
of MANETs, because the assumption on uniformity of network node density
is often unrealistic to describe the actual communication areas. This problem
appears in both modeling the node behavior of MANETs and quantitation of
their network survivability. In this chapter, we focus on the border eects in
MANETs and reformulate the network survivability models based on a SMP,
where two kinds of communication network areas are considered; square area
and circular area. Based on some geometric ideas, we improve the quantitative
network survivability measures for three stochastic models by taking account of
the border eects, and revisit the existing lower and upper bounds of connectivity-
based network survivability.
2.1 Preliminary
2.1.1 State of Node
Since nodes in MANETs cooperate with the routing processes to maintain net-
work connectivity, each of node is designed as it behaves autonomously, but
its discipline to require, send and receive the route information, is dened as a
strict protocol. At the same time, it is also important to decide the protocol
in order to prevent propagation of the erroneous route information caused by
malicious attacks. Xing and Wang [11, 12] consider a MANET that suers such
7
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a malicious attack, whose node states are dened as follows:
 Cooperative state (C): Initialized state of a node, which responds to route
discoveries and forwards data packets to others.
 Selsh state (S): State of a node, which may not forward control packets
or data packets to others, but responds to only route discoveries for its
own purpose from the reason of low power.
 Jellysh state (J): State of a node, which launches Jellysh DoS attack.
 Black hole state (B): State of a node, which launches Black hole DoS
attack.
 Failed state (F ): State of a node, which can no longer perform basic
functions such as initiation or response of route discoveries.
For common DoS attacks, the node in Jellysh attack receives route requests
and route replies. The main mechanism of Jellysh state is to delay packets
without any reason. On the other hand, the node in Black hole attack can
respond a node with a fake message immediately by declaring as it is in the
optimal path or as it is only one-hop away to other nodes.
Based on the node classication above, we consider a semi-Markov model to
describe the stochastic behavior of a node by combining states with respect to
the wellness. Suppose that a node may change its behavior under the following
assumptions:
 A cooperative node may become a failed node due to energy exhaustion or
misconguration. It is apt to become a malicious node when it launches
DoS attack.
 A malicious node cannot become a cooperative node again, but may be-
come a failed node.
 A node in failed state may become a cooperative node again after it is
repaired and responds to routing requests to others.
 A failed node can become cooperative again if it is recovered and responds
to routing operations.
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2.1.2 Semi-Markov Node Model
Similar to [11, 12], let S = fC, S, J , B, Fg be a state space, and describe the
node behavior transition by a stochastic process, fZ(t); t  0g, associated with
space S. Let Xn denote the state at transition time tn. Dene
Pr(Xn+1 = xn+1jX0 = x0:; ; ; Xn = xn)
= Pr(Xn+1 = xn+1jXn = xn); (2.1)
where xi 2 S for 0  i  n + 1. From Eq. (2.1), the stochastic process fXn,
n = 0; 1; 2; :::g constitutes a CTMC with state space S, if all the transition
times are exponentially distributed. However, since the transition time from
one state to another state is subject to random behavior of a node, it is not
realistic to characterize all the transition times by only exponentially distributed
random variables. For instance, if a node is more inclined to fail due to energy
consumption as time passes, and the less residual energy is left, then the more
likely a node changes its behavior to selsh. This implies that the future action
of a node may depend on how long it has been in the current state and that
transition intervals may have arbitrary probability distributions.
From the above reason it is common to assume a SMP for fZ(t); t  0g to
describe the node behavior transitions, which is dened by
Z(t) = Xn; 8tn  t  tn+1: (2.2)
Letting Tn = tn+1 tn be the sojourn time between the n-th and (n+ 1)-st
transitions, we dene the associated semi-Markov kernel Q = (Qij(t)) by
Qij(t) = Pr(Xn+1 = j; Tn  tjXn = i) = pijFij(t); (2.3)
where pij =limt!1Qij(t) = Pr(Xn+1 = jjXn = i) is the transition probability
between state i and j (i; j = c; s; j; b; f) corresponding to S = fC; S; J;B; Fg,
and Fij(t) = Pr(Tn < tjXn+1 = j;Xn = i) is the transition time distribution
from state i to j.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the transition diagram of the homogeneous SMP, fZ(t);
t  0g, under consideration, which is somewhat dierent from the SMP in
[11, 12], because it is somewhat simplied by eliminating redundant states. Let
1=ij denote the mean transition time from state i to state j, and dene the
10 CHAPTER 2. SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS WITH BORDER EFFECTS
C
FS
J B
DoS Attack states
Fcj(t)
Fsc(t)
Fcs(t)
Fsf(t)
Fcf(t)
Ffc(t)
Fjf(t)
Fbf(t)
Fcb(t)
Fsb(t)
Fsj(t)
Figure 2.1: Semi-Markov transition diagram for node behavior.
Laplace-Stieltjes transform (LST) by qij(s) =
R1
0
expf stgdQij(t). From the
familiar SMP analysis technique, it is immediate to see that
qcs(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF cj(t)F cb(t)F cf (t)dFcs(t) (2.4)
qcj(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF cs(t)F cb(t)F cf (t)dFcj(t) (2.5)
qcb(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF cs(t)F cj(t)F cf (t)dFcb(t) (2.6)
qcf (s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF cs(t)F cj(t)F cb(t)dFcf (t) (2.7)
qsc(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF sj(t)F sb(t)F sf (t)dFsc(t) (2.8)
qsj(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF sc(t)F sb(t)F sf (t)dFsj(t) (2.9)
qsb(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF sc(t)F sj(t)F sf (t)dFsb(t) (2.10)
qsf (s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF sc(t)F sj(t)F sb(t)dFsf (t) (2.11)
qjf (s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgdFjf (t) (2.12)
qbf (s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgdFbf (t) (2.13)
qfc(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgdFfc(t); (2.14)
where in general  () = 1  (). Dene the recurrent time distribution from
state C to state C and its LST by Hcc(t) and hcc(s), respectively. Then, from
2.2. QUANTITATIVE NETWORK SURVIVABILITY MEASURE 11
the one-step transition probabilities from Eqs.(2.4)-(2.14), we have
hcc(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgdHcc(t)
=qcs(s)qsc(s) + qcs(s)qsj(s)qjf (s)qfc(s)
+ qcs(s)qsb(s)qbf (s)qfc(s) + qcs(s)qsf (s)qfc(s)
+ qcj(s)qjf (s)qfc(s) + qcb(s)qbf (s)qfc(s)
+ qcf (s)qfc(s): (2.15)
Let Pci(t) denote the transition probability from the initial state C to re-
spective states i 2 fc; s; j; b; fg corresponding to S = fC;S; J;B; Fg. Then, the
LSTs of the transition probability, pci =
R1
0
expf stgdPci(t), are given by
pcc(s) =
n
qcs(s) qcj(s) qcb(s) qcf (s)
o
=hcc(s) (2.16)
pcs(s) =qcs(s)
n
qsc(s) qsj(s) qsb(s) qsf (s)
o
=hcc(s) (2.17)
pcj(s) =fqcm(s) + qcs(s)qsj(s)gqmf (s)=hcc(s) (2.18)
pcb(s) =fqcm(s) + qcs(s)qsb(s)gqmf (s)=hcc(s) (2.19)
pcf (s) =fqcf (s) + qcs(s)qsf (s) + qcs(s)qsj(s)qjf (s)
+ qcs(s)qsb(s)qbf (s) + qcj(s)qjf (s)
+ qcb(s)qbf (s)gqfc(s)=hcc(s): (2.20)
From Eqs.(2.16)-(2.20), the transient solutions, Pci(t), i 2 fc; s; j; b; fg,
which mean the probability that the state travels in another state i at time
t, can be derived numerically, by means of the Laplace inversion technique (e.g.
see [45]). As a special case, it is easy to derive the steady-state probability
Pi = limt!1 Pci(t); i 2 fc; s; b; j; fg corresponding to S. Based on the LSTs,
pcj(s), we calculate Pi = limt!1 Pci(t) = lims!0 pci(s) from Eqs.(2.16)-(2.20).
2.2 Quantitative Network Survivability Measure
2.2.1 Node Isolation and Connectivity
An immediate eect of node misbehaviors and failures in MANETs is the node
isolation problem [12]. It is a direct cause for network partitioning, and eventu-
ally aects network survivability. The node isolation problem is caused by four
types of neighbors; Failed, Selsh, Jellysh and Blackhole nodes. For an exam-
ple, we suppose in Fig. 2.2 that the node u has 4 neighbors when it initiates a
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Figure 2.2: Isolation by Failed, Sel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sh neighbors.
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Figure 2.3: Isolation by Blackhole neighbors.
route discovery to another node v. Then it must go through by its neighbors
xi (i = 1; 2; 3; 4). If all neighbors of u are Failed, Selsh or Jellysh nodes,
then u can no longer communicate with the other nodes. In this case, we nd
that u is isolated by Failed and Selsh neighbors. On the other hand, if one of
neighbors is Blackhole (i.e. x2 in Fig. 2.3), it gives u a faked one-hope path,
and makes u always choose it. In this case, we nd that u is isolated by the
Blackhole neighbor.
We dene the node degree D(u) for node u by the maximum number of
neighbors [13], and let D(i;u) be the number of node u's neighbors at state
i 2 fc; s; j; b; fg. Then the isolation problem in our model can be formulated
as follows: Given a node u with degree d, i.e., D(u) = d, if D(s;u) + D(f;u) +
D(j;u) = d or D(b;u)  1, then the cooperative degree is zero, i.e., D(c;u) = 0,
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and u is isolated from the network, so it holds that
Pr(D(c;u) = 0jD(u) = d)
=Pr(D(b;u)  1jD(u) = d) + Pr(D(s;u) +D(f;u) +D(j;c) = djD(u) = d)
=1 (1 Pb)
d + (1 Pc Pb)
d;
(2.21)
where Pc is the steady-state probability of a node in a cooperative state and
Pb is the steady-state probability of a node launching Blackhole attacks. In the
transient case, the steady-state probability Pc and Pb are replaced by Pcc(t) and
Pcb(t), respectively.
In this paper, a node is said to be k-connected to a network if its associated
cooperative degree is given by k ( 1). Given node u with degree d, i.e., D(u) =
d, u is said to be k-connected to the network if the cooperative degree is k, i.e.
D(c;u) = k, which holds only if u has no Blackhole neighbor and has exactly k
cooperative neighbors, i.e., D(b;u) = 0 and D(c;u) = k, respectively. Then, from
the statistical independence of all nodes, it is straightforward to see that
Pr(D(c;u) = kjD(u) = d)
=Pr(D(c;u) = k;D(b;u) = 0jD(u) = d)
=Pr(D(c;u) = k;D(b;c) = 0; D(s;u) +D(f;u) +D(J;u) = d k)
=

d
k

(Pc)
k(1 Pc Pb)
d k: (2.22)
2.2.2 Network Survivability
In the seminal paper [12], the network survivability is dened as the probability
that MANET is a k-vertex-connected graph. Strictly speaking, it is dicult to
validate the vertex-connectivity in the graph whose conguration dynamically
changes such as MANETs. Therefore, Xing and Wang [12] derive approximately
low and upper bounds of network survivability when the number of nodes is
suciently large by considering the connectivity of a node in a MANET M.
The upper and lower bounds of connectivity-based network survivability are
given by
NSk(M)U = (1 Pr(D(c;u) < k))ND ; (2.23)
NSk(M)L = max(0; 1 E[Na](Pr(D(c;u) < k))); (2.24)
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respectively, where u is an arbitrary node index in the active network. In Eq.
(2.24), E[Na] = bN(1 Pf )c is the expected number of active nodes in the
network, where bc is the maximum integer less than , Pf is the steady-state
probability that a node is failed, and N denotes the total number of nodes. In
Eq. (2.23), ND is the number of points whose transmission ranges are mutually
disjoint over the MANET area. Let A and r be the area of MANET and the
node transmission radius, respectively. The number of disjoint points is given
by ND = bN=(r2)c, where  = N=A is the node density.
In this paper, we follow the same denition of network survivability as refer-
ence [12], but consider the expected network survivability instead of the low and
upper bounds. Getting help from the graph theory, the expected network sur-
vivability is approximately given by the probability that expected active node
in the network is k-connected:
NSk(M)E 

1 Pr(D(c;u) < k)
	E[Na]
: (2.25)
By the well-known total probability law, we have
Pr(D(c;u) < k) =
1X
d=k
Pr(D(c;u) < kjD(u) = d) Pr(D(u) = d); (2.26)
so that we need to nd the explicit forms of Pr(D(c;u) < kjD(u) = d) and
Pr(D(u) = d). From Eqs.(2.21) and (2.22), it is easy to obtain
Pr(D(c;u) < kjD(u) = d)
=Pr(D(c;u) = 0jD(u) = d) +
k 1X
m=1
Pr(D(c;u) = mjD(u) = d)
=1 (1 Pb)
d +
k 1X
m=0

d
m

Pmc (1 Pc Pb)
d m
=1 (1 Pb)
d +
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb); (2.27)
where Bm denotes the multinomial probability mass function. Replacing Pb and
Pc by Pcb(t) and Pcc(t) respectively, we obtain the transient network survivabil-
ity at an arbitrary time t. To derive Pr(D = d), Xing and Wang [12] used the
Poissonization technique and presented the Poisson node degree model by using
Poisson distribution. On the other hand, we know that binomial distribution
can converge the Poisson distribution if the parameter of Poisson distribution 
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equals np and n tends to be innite while the probability p approaches 0, where
n and p are parameters of binomial distribution. Also, the negative binomial
distribution can converge to Poisson distribution by other technique. Based on
the above, we present the binomial and negative binomial node degree models.
(i) Poisson Model [11, 12]
Suppose thatN nodes in a MANET are uniformly distributed over a 2-dimensional
square with area A. The node transmission radius, denoted by r, is assumed to
be identical for all nodes. To derive the node degree distribution Pr(D(u) = d),
we divide the area into N small grids virtually, so that the grid size has the
same order as the physical size of a node. Consider the case where the network
area is suciently larger than the physical node size. Then, the probability that
a node occupies a specic grid, denoted by p, is very small. With large N and
small p, the node distribution can be modeled by the Poisson distribution:
Pr(D(u) = d) =
d
d!
e ; (2.28)
where  = r2, and  = E[Na]=A is the node density depending on the under-
lying model. Finally, substituting Eqs.(2.26)-(2.28) into Eq. (2.25) yields
NSk(M)PE 

e Pb

1
(k; Pc)
(k)
E[Na]
; (2.29)
where (x) = (x 1)!and (h; x) = ( h 1)!e x
Ph 1
l=0 x
l=l! are the complete
and incomplete gamma functions, respectively.
(ii) Binomial Model
It is evident that the Poisson model just focuses on an ideal situation of node
behavior. In other words, it is not always easy to measure the physical parame-
ters such as r and A in practice. Let p denote the probability that each node is
assigned into a communicate network area of a node. For the expected number
of activated nodes E[Na], we describe the node distribution by the binomial
distribution:
Pr(D(u) = d) =

E[Na]
d

pd(1 p)E[Na] d
= Bd(E[Na]; p); (2.30)
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where Bd is the binomial probability mass function. Substituting Eq. (2.30)
into Eq. (2.25) yields an alternative formula of the network survivability:
NSk(M)BE 8<:
E[Na]X
k=0
Bd(E[Na]; p)
"
(1 Pb)
d
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb)
#9=;
E[Na]
:
(2.31)
Even though each node is assigned into a communication network area of a node
with probability p = r2=A, then the corresponding binomial model results a
dierent survivability measure from the Poisson model.
(iii) Negative Binomial Model
The negative binomial model comes from a mixed Poisson distribution instead
of Poisson distribution. Let f() be the distribution of parameter  in the Pois-
son model. This implicitly assumes that the parameter  includes uncertainty,
and that the node distributions for all disjoint areas have dierent Poisson pa-
rameters. Then the node distribution can be represented by the following mixed
Poisson distribution:
P (D(u) = d) =
Z 1
0
e 
d
d!
f()d: (2.32)
For the sake of analytical simplicity, let f() be the gamma probability density
function with mean r2N(1 Pf )=A and coecient of variation c. Then we
have
P (D(u) = d) =
(a+ d)
d! (a)

b
1 + b
a
1
1 + b
d
= d(a; b); (2.33)
where a = b1=c2c and b = bA=(r2N(1 Pf )c2)c. It should be noted that
Eq. (2.33) corresponds to the negative binomial probability mass function with
mean r2N(1 Pf )=A, and that the variance is greater than that in the Poisson
model. In other words, it can represent the overdispersion or underdispersion
property dissimilar to the Poisson model. From Eq. (2.33), we can obtain an
alternative representation of the network survivability with an additional model
parameter c.
NSk(M)NBE 
8<:
E[Na]X
k=0
d(a; b)
"
(1 Pb)
d
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb)
#9=;
E[Na]
:
(2.34)
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Figure 2.4: Border eects in square area.
2.3 Border Eects of Communication Network
Area
The results on network survivability presented in Section 2.2 are based on the
assumption that network area A has a node density  = E[Na]=A. This strong
assumption means that the expected number of neighbors of a node in the
network has the exactly same value as r2. In other words, such an assumption
is not realistic in the real world communication network circumstance. It is well
known that the border eect tends to decrease both the communication coverage
and the node degree, which reect the whole network availability. Laranjeira and
Rodrigues [17] show that the relative average node degree for nodes in borders
is independent of the node transmission range and of the overall network node
density in a square communication network area. Bettsetetter [18] calculates the
average node degree for nodes in borders for a circular communication network
area. In the remaining part of this section, we consider the above two kinds of
areas, and apply both results by Laranjeira and Rodrigues [17] and Bettsetetter
[18] for the network survivability quantication.
2.3.1 Square Border Eect
Given a square area of side L in Fig. 2.4, the borders correspond to region B and
C. We call the rectangular region B the lateral border, the square region C the
corne border, and the square region I the inner region, respectively. In Fig. 2.4,
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Figure 2.5: Eective coverage area for a node in the lateral border.
for a node v located in the inner region of the network area, the expected eective
number of neighbors, EI , is given by r
2. This result is from the fact that the
eective coverage area of a point in the inner region I is precisely equal to r2.
However, the eective coverage area for a point in the border region B (node
u1) or C (node u2) is less than r
2 as shown in the shadow areas of Fig. 2.4.
Consequently, the expected eective number of neighbors of nodes located in
the border areas will be smaller than r2. Since the connectivity properties of
the network depend on the expected eective number of neighbors of nodes, it
is needed to obtain the expected eective number of neighbors of nodes in these
regions (I, B and C), in order to understand the connectivity properties in the
network.
In Fig. 2.5, the eective coverage area for a node located at a point P (x; y),
in relation to the origin O(0,0) and the lateral border B, is dened as EAB. Let
\P1PP4 = . Then, it can be seen that EAB is equal to the area of the portion
of a circle, which corresponds to the area through the points P , P1, P2 and P3.
Then we have
EAB(x; y) = r
2 [( ) + (sin)(cos)] ; (2.35)
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where  = cos 1(x=r). After a few algebraic manipulations, we get
EAB(x; y) = r
2
"
 cos 1
x
r

+
x
r
r
1
x
r
2#
: (2.36)
Next we derive the average eective coverage area, lat, for nodes in the
lateral border B by integrating EAB in Eq.(2.36) over the entire lateral border
and diving the result by its total area r(L 2r):
lat =
1
r(L 2r)
Z L 2r
0
Z r
0
EAB(x; y)dx

dy: (2.37)
Substituting Eq. (2.35) into Eq. (2.37), we get
lat = r
2


2
3

 0:787793r2: (2.38)
Then, the expected eective node degree Elat for nodes in the lateral border
region B is given by
Elat = lat = 0:787793r
2: (2.39)
In the similar way, the average eective coverage area cor for nodes in the
corner border C and the expected eective node degree Ecor for nodes in the
lateral corner region C are obtained as [17]:
cor  0:615336r2 (2.40)
and
Ecor = cor = 0:615336r
2: (2.41)
Finally, the expected eective node degree s for nodes in square commu-
nication network area is obtained as the weighted average with EI , Elat and
Ecor:
s =
EIAI + ElatAB + EcorAC
A
; (2.42)
where AI = (L 2r)
2, AB = 4r(L 2r), AC = 4r
2 and A = L2. Substituting
the area and expected node degree values in Eq. (2.42) and simplifying the
resulting expression, we have
 = s =
r2
L2
; (2.43)
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Figure 2.6: Border eects in circular area.
where  = (L 2r)2 + 3:07492r(L 2r) + 2:461344r2.
For the binomial model, we need to nd the probability that a node is
assigned into the expected coverage of node in square communicate area (ps).
It can be obtained as
p = ps =
r2
L4
: (2.44)
On the other hand, the parameter b in the negative binomial model with square
border eect, bs, can be derived by
b = bs = 1= r
2Nac
2

(2.45)
for a given coecient of variation c.
2.3.2 Circular Border Eect
For the circular area A with radius r0, dene the origin O in A and use the
coordinates r for a node in Fig. 2.6. Nodes in the circular communication
network area that are located at least r away from the border, are called the
center nodes, which are shown as a node v in Fig. 2.6. They have a coverage
area equal to r2 and an expected node degree E[Na]r
2=A. On the other hand,
nodes located closer than r to the border are called the border nodes (node u
in Fig. 2.6), which have a smaller coverage area, leading to a smaller expected
node degree. The expected node degree of both center nodes and border nodes
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can be obtained by
 =
8>>>><>>>>:
Nar^1
2 0  r^  1 r^1
n

 
r^20 arccos
r^2+r^21 1
2r^r^1
+ arccos
r^2 r^21+1
2r^
1
2

1 r^1 < r^  1;
(2.46)
where  = (r^ + r^1 + 1)( r^ + r^1 + 1)(r^ r^1 + 1)(r^ + r^1 1), r^ = r=r0 and
r^1 = r1=r0.
Bettsettter [18] obtains the expected node degree of a node  = c in circular
communicate area:
c =
Na
2

4(1 r^2) arcsin
r^
2
+ 2r^2 (2r^ + r^3)
r
1
r^2
4

; (2.47)
which can be simplied by using Taylor series as
c  Nar^2

1
4r^
3

: (2.48)
Then, p = pc for the binomial model and b = bc for the negative binomial model
can be given in the following:
pc =

2
; (2.49)
bc =
1
2r^2Nac2
; (2.50)
where  = 4(1 r^2) arcsin(r^=2) + 2r^2 (2r^ + r^3)
p
1 r^2=4. By replacing the
square border eect parameters , p and b in Eqs.(2.29), (2.31) and (2.34) by
s, ps and bs in Eqs.(2.43)-(2.45), we obtain the connectivity-based network
survivability formulae with square border eects. Also, using c, pc and bc in
Eqs.(2.48)-(2.50), we calculate the connectivity-based network survivability in
circular communication network area. We summarize rened network surviv-
ability formulae by taking account of border eects in Table 2.1.
2.4 Numerical Examples
2.4.1 Comparison of Steady-state Network Survivability
In this section, we investigate border eects in the connectivity-based network
survivability quantication with three stochastic models. According to the con-
nectivity analysis, given a network consisting of N = 500 nodes, we deploy all
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Table 2.1: Summary of expected network survivability formulae with/without
border eects.
Border Eects Poisson Binomial Negative Binomial
Ignorance
n
e Pb
h
1  (k;Pc) (k)
ioE[Na] nPn
k=0Bd(n; p)
h

ioE[Na] nPn
k=0 d(a; b)
h

ioE[Na]
Square
n
e sPb
h
1  (k;sPc) (k)
ioE[Na] nPn
k=0Bd(n; ps)
h

ioE[Na] nPn
k=0 d(a; bs)
h

ioE[Na]
Circular
n
e cPb
h
1  (k;cPc) (k)
ioE[Na] nPn
k=0Bd(n; pc)
h

ioE[Na] nPn
k=0 d(a; bc)
h

ioE[Na]
 (1 Pb)d
Pk 1
m=0Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb)
the nodes in a square area of side L = 1000(m2). If the transmission radius
of the nodes is greater than 83, i.e., r > 83, the probability that network is
1-connected is higher than 99%. From the simulation experiments, the result
points out that a transmission radius of at least r = 105(m) is necessary to
achieve a 1-connected network with probability higher than 99% [17]. However,
the network survivability is more complicated. It does not depend on only the
network parameters (A; r;N), but also needs to determine the probability of
each state of nodes. We set up the following model parameters [12]:
c;s = 1=240:0 [1/sec]; c;j = 3=2.0e+7 [1/sec];
c;b = 1=6.0e+7 [1/sec]; c;f = 1=500:0 [1/sec];
s;c = 1=60:0 [1/sec]; s;j = 3=2.0e+7 [1/sec];
s;b = 1=6.0e+7 [1/sec]; s;f = 1=500:0 [1/sec];
j;f = 1=50:0 [1/sec]; b;f = 1=50:0 [1/sec];
j;f = 1=60:0 [1/sec];
where ij are transition rates from state i to state j in the exponential distribu-
tions. Under the above model parameters, the node probabilities in the steady
state are given by
Pc = 0:7299; Ps = 0:1629; Pj = 6:696e-6;
Pb = 7:44e-7; Pf = 0:1072:
We also assume the network parameters as follows:
 A = 1000 (m) 1000 (m): the area of MANET.
 N = 500: the number of mobile nodes.
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Figure 2.7: Eects of r on the expected node degree.
First, we compare the lower and upper bounds of connectivity-based net-
work survivability [11, 12] with our expected network survivability in Eq.(2.29),
(2.31) or (2.34). We set the transition radius r from 80 to 130, and connectivity
requirement k from 1 to 3. The comparative results are shown in Table 2.2.
From this table, we can see that the dierence between lower and upper bounds
of network survivability is very large for specic values of r and k. For example,
when r = 100 and k = 3, the lower and upper bounds of network survivabil-
ity in the Poisson model are equal to 0.0000 and 0.9296, respectively. On the
other hand, the expected network survivability always takes a value between
lower and upper bounds. This result shows us that our expected network sur-
vivability measure is more useful than the bounds for quantication of network
survivability. Since it is known in [17, 18] that the number of neighbors of a
node located in border areas is smaller than that located in the inner area, i.e.,
the border eect is eective, we compare the expected number of neighbors in
both types of network area in Fig. 2.7. From this result, it can be seen that as
transmission radius increases, the gap between two cases with and without bor-
der eects becomes remarkable. Especially, it is found that the node in square
area aects the border eect more than that in circular area.
To evaluate the accuracy of our analytical results on border eects, we con-
duct a Monte Carlo simulation, where two types of network communication ar-
eas; square area and circular area, are assumed identically to be A = 1; 000; 000
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Table 2.2: Comparison of lower and upper bounds with expected network sur-
vivability.
Poisson Binomial Negative Binomial
r k SV BL SVB SV BU SV BL SVB SV BU SV BL SVB SV BU
1 0.3595 0.5268 0.9311 0.3807 0.5381 0.9333 0.3278 0.5103 0.927
80 2 0.0000 0.0079 0.5830 0.0000 0.0088 0.5902 0.0000 0.0066 0.5716
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.1219 0.0000 0.0088 0.1256 0.0000 0.0000 0.1154
1 0.8844 0.8908 0.9899 0.8908 0.8965 0.9904 0.8753 0.8827 0.9891
90 2 0.0000 0.3519 0.9122 0.0020 0.3682 0.9158 0.0000 0.3295 0.9069
3 0.0000 0.0073 0.6487 0.0000 0.0086 0.6576 0.0000 0.0058 0.6354
1 0.9793 0.9796 0.9985 0.9808 0.9810 0.9986 0.9773 0.9776 0.9984
100 2 0.8156 0.8316 0.9869 0.8289 0.8427 0.9879 0.7971 0.8163 0.9856
3 0.0000 0.3593 0.9296 0.0367 0.3812 0.9336 0.0000 0.3304 0.9241
1 0.9925 0.9925 0.9996 0.9928 0.9928 0.9996 0.9921 0.9922 0.9995
110 2 0.9694 0.9699 0.9982 0.9723 0.9727 0.9984 0.9654 0.9660 0.9980
3 0.8264 0.8406 0.9898 0.8426 0.8543 0.9908 0.8041 0.8220 0.9885
1 0.9931 0.9931 0.9997 0.9932 0.9932 0.9997 0.9931 0.9931 0.9997
120 2 0.9905 0.9906 0.9995 0.9910 0.9910 0.9996 0.9898 0.9899 0.9995
3 0.9713 0.9717 0.9986 0.9745 0.9748 0.9987 0.9667 0.9673 0.9984
1 0.9921 0.9921 0.9997 0.9921 0.9922 0.9997 0.9921 0.9921 0.9997
130 2 0.9919 0.9919 0.9997 0.9920 0.9920 0.9997 0.9918 0.9918 0.9997
3 0.9898 0.9899 0.9996 0.9903 0.9904 0.9996 0.9891 0.9892 0.9995
(m2). The expected active number of nodes, E[Na], is given by 446 with dier-
ent communication radius r, which ranges from 80 to 130. We make r increase
by 5. The random generation of active nodes is made 50 times for one radius.
In each simulation, 20 nodes are randomly chosen, and the number of neighbors
is counted for each node. Finally we get 1,000 values of number of neighbors
for each r. From this result, we calculate the average number of neighbors for
a node in both square and circular communication areas. Table 2.3 compares
the simulation results with analytical ones in terms of the number of neighbors,
where `ignorance' denotes the case without border eects in [11, 12], `Square/a'
(`Circular/a') is the number of neighbors based on the analytical approach in
Eq.(2.43) (Eq.(2.48)), and `Square/s' (`Circular/s') is the simulation result in
square (circular) area. In the comparison, we can see that the analytical results
taking account of border eects get closer to the simulation results. However,
the ignorance of border eects leads to an underestimation of the number of
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Table 2.3: Simulation and analytical results on node degree.
Number of neighbors
r Ignorance Square/a Square/s Circular/a Circular/s
80 8.9751 8.3288 8.1390 8.4350 8.5840
85 10.1321 9.3582 9.3510 9.4842 9.6990
90 11.3592 10.4421 10.5950 10.5901 10.6790
95 12.6563 11.5797 11.6510 11.7519 11.7150
100 14.0237 12.7700 12.8280 12.9687 13.0730
105 15.4611 14.0124 13.9660 14.2398 14.3040
110 16.9686 15.3059 15.2910 15.5645 15.6250
115 18.5463 16.6497 16.6480 16.9418 17.1330
120 20.1941 18.0429 17.9260 18.3711 18.3100
125 21.9120 19.4848 19.6190 19.8515 19.7780
130 23.7000 20.9746 21.1300 21.3823 21.2570
neighbors.
Table 2.4 presents the dependence of connectivity k and the number of nodes
N on the steady-state network survivability among three stochastic models with
and without border eects. Poisson model (Poisson), binomial model (Binomial)
and negative binomial model (Negative Binomial) are compared in cases without
border eects, which are denoted by Ignorance, Square and Circular in the
table. From these results, it is shown that the network survivability is reduced
ercely as k increases when the number of nodes N is relatively small. The
border eect is negligible in analysis if the network area is much larger than
the transmission coverage area of a single node and the node density is not
high. For example, the dierence of survivability between with/without border
eects for 1-conneted network is less than 1%, when N > 500. The same results
are shown in Table 2.4. We can ignore the border eects when N > 700 and
N > 900 for 2-connected and 3-connected networks, respectively. In Fig. 2.8,
we show the dependence of r and k on the steady-state network survivability in
the Poisson model. From this gure, we nd that the transition radius rather
aects the steady-state network survivability, if each node has a relatively large
r which is greater than 120(m). In this case even for the 3-connected network,
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Table 2.4: Steady-state network survivability with three stochastic models.
Poisson Binomial Negative Binomial
N k Ignorance Square Circular Ignorance Square Circular Ignorance Square Circular
1 0.9787 0.9549 0.9602 0.9809 0.9594 0.9642 0.9780 0.9545 0.9592
500 2 0.8249 0.6473 0.6824 0.8416 0.6735 0.7072 0.8193 0.6476 0.6780
3 0.3435 0.1052 0.1350 0.3786 0.1257 0.1587 0.3373 0.1092 0.1351
1 0.9909 0.9865 0.9876 0.9912 0.9873 0.9883 0.9905 0.9856 0.9868
600 2 0.9611 0.9078 0.9200 0.9643 0.9146 0.9260 0.9569 0.8986 0.9121
3 0.7971 0.5700 0.6147 0.8120 0.5916 0.6355 0.7781 0.5415 0.5884
1 0.9905 0.9904 0.9905 0.9906 0.9905 0.9906 0.9905 0.9902 0.9903
700 2 0.9853 0.9732 0.9762 0.9859 0.9749 0.9777 0.9843 0.9708 0.9743
3 0.9482 0.8680 0.8866 0.9524 0.8772 0.8948 0.9421 0.8556 0.8761
1 0.9881 0.9890 0.9889 0.9881 0.9890 0.9889 0.9881 0.9889 0.9888
800 2 0.9872 0.9855 0.9860 0.9874 0.9859 0.9864 0.9870 0.9849 0.9856
3 0.9799 0.9597 0.9649 0.9809 0.9624 0.9672 0.9786 0.9561 0.9620
1 0.9850 0.9863 0.9861 0.9850 0.9863 0.9861 0.9850 0.9863 0.9861
900 2 0.9849 0.9856 0.9856 0.9849 0.9857 0.9857 0.9848 0.9855 0.9855
3 0.9835 0.9799 0.9810 0.9838 0.9807 0.9816 0.9832 0.9790 0.9802
1 0.9815 0.9832 0.9829 0.9816 0.9832 0.9829 0.9815 0.9832 0.9829
1000 2 0.9815 0.9830 0.9828 0.9815 0.9831 0.9828 0.9815 0.9830 0.9828
3 0.9813 0.9818 0.9819 0.9813 0.9820 0.9820 0.9812 0.9816 0.9817
the steady-state network survivability becomes 0.8 and tends to take a lower
value. On the other hand, if n is suciently large and p is suciently small
under  = np, from the small number's law, the binomial distribution can
be well approximated by the Poisson distribution. This asymptotic inference
can be conrmed in Fig. 2.9. So, three stochastic models provide almost similar
performance in terms of connectivity-based network survivability in such a case.
2.4.2 Transient Analysis of Network Survivability
Next we concern the transient network survivability at arbitrary time t. For
the numerical inversion of Laplace-Stieltjes transform, we apply the well-known
Abate's algorithm [45]. Although we omit to show here for brevity, it can
be numerically checked that the transient probability Pcc(t) decreases in the
rst phase and approaches to the steady-state solution as time goes on. The
other probability Pcs(t), Pcj(t), Pcb(t) and Pcf (t) increase in the rst phase,
but converge to their associated saturation levels asymptotically. Reminding
these asymptotic properties on transition probabilities, we set N = 500 and
r = 100, and consider the transient network survivability of three stochastic
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Figure 2.8: Eects of k on the steady-state network survivability.
models with and without border eects in Table 2.5. The network survivability
with or without border eects has almost the similar initial values (0.9999), and
the dierences between them will be remarkable as time elapses.
Because three stochastic models show the quite similar tendency, hereafter
we focus on only the Poisson model with k-connectivity (k = 1; 2; 3; 4) to in-
vestigate the impact on the transient network survivability. From Fig. 2.10,
it is seen that the Poisson model has a higher transient network survivability
when k is lower. Also, when the connectivity level becomes higher, the transient
network survivability gets closer to 0 with time t elapsing. Finally we compare
the Poisson model with and without border eects in terms of the transient
network survivability. Figure 2.11 illustrates the transient network survivability
when k = 1. It is shown that if the border eects are taken into consideration,
the transient network survivability drops down as the operation time goes on.
However, the transient solution without border eects still keeps higher levels in
the same situation. This fact implies that the ignorance of border eects leads
to an underestimation of network survivability. Since such an optimistic assess-
ment of network survivability may result a risk through the network operation,
it is recommended to take account of border eects in the connectivity-based
network survivability assessment in MANETs.
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Figure 2.9: Comparison of three stochastic models with two types of border
eect.
Table 2.5: Transient network survivability with three stochastic models.
Poisson Binomial Negative Binomial
t k Ignorance Square Circular Ignorance Square Circular Ignorance Square Circular
1 0.9999 0.9997 0.9998 0.9999 0.9997 0.9998 0.9999 0.9996 0.9997
0 2 0.9987 0.9953 0.9962 0.9990 0.9960 0.9968 0.9984 0.9944 0.9954
3 0.9895 0.9645 0.9707 0.9910 0.9688 0.9744 0.9871 0.9591 0.9653
1 0.9950 0.9915 0.9923 0.9953 0.9921 0.9929 0.9947 0.9906 0.9906
40 2 0.9719 0.9289 0.9388 0.9746 0.9350 0.9442 0.9680 0.9204 0.9204
3 0.8395 0.6425 0.6825 0.8527 0.6642 0.7032 0.8208 0.6131 0.6131
1 0.9893 0.9785 0.9810 0.9899 0.9799 0.9822 0.9883 0.9762 0.9791
80 2 0.9186 0.8150 0.8371 0.9241 0.8252 0.8466 0.9091 0.7979 0.8220
3 0.6076 0.3221 0.3696 0.6253 0.3397 0.3882 0.5768 0.2926 0.3401
1 0.9845 0.9678 0.9716 0.9855 0.9700 0.9735 0.9830 0.9646 0.9689
120 2 0.8752 0.7336 0.7627 0.8834 0.7475 0.7758 0.8624 0.7130 0.7442
3 0.4682 0.1919 0.2321 0.4888 0.2072 0.2492 0.4368 0.1699 0.2087
1 0.9819 0.9619 0.9664 0.9830 0.9643 0.9686 0.9800 0.9580 0.9631
160 2 0.8515 0.6924 0.7245 0.8608 0.7073 0.7386 0.8368 0.6698 0.7040
3 0.4057 0.1456 0.1809 0.4259 0.1586 0.1958 0.3742 0.1267 0.1602
1 0.9806 0.9590 0.9638 0.9820 0.9619 0.9665 0.9787 0.9553 0.9607
200 2 0.8402 0.6735 0.7068 0.8512 0.6908 0.7233 0.8260 0.6523 0.6876
3 0.3788 0.1278 0.1608 0.4016 0.1417 0.1769 0.3505 0.1121 0.1434
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Figure 2.10: Transient network survivability with varying k.
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Figure 2.11: Transient network survivability with border eects.

Chapter 3
Survivability Analysis for
Power-Aware MANETs
This chapter presents the quantitative network survivability analysis for a power-
aware MANET based on MRGPs. The MRGP is one of the widest class of
stochastic point processes which are mathematically tractable. In the past liter-
ature, the model for a power-aware MANET was described by a CTMC. How-
ever, in the sense of representation ability, CTMC modeling is not sucient to
analyze the relationship between battery state and node behavior in the power-
aware MANET. In particular, such problem seriously arises when we treat the
transient behavior of the power-aware MANET. In this chapter, we revisit a
power-aware MANET model by using MRGP, and present both stationary and
transient analyses for the MRGP-based model.
3.1 Model Description
3.1.1 State of Node
In MANETs, nodes cooperate for the routing processes to maintain network
connectivity [2]. Every node in MANET is designed as it behaves autonomously,
and thus the behavior of requiring, sending and receiving route information
should be decided as a strict protocol. Moreover, we nd that it is also important
to determine the protocol to prevent propagation of erroneous route information
that is cause by malicious attacks. Xing and Wang [11, 12] discusss such a
MANET that is suered by a malicious attack, and present the following node
states with represent to the wellness of a node:
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 Cooperative state (C): an initialized state of a node which responds to
route discoveries and forward data packets for others.
 Selsh state (S): a node may not forward control or data packets for
others, and olny responds to route discoveries for its own purpose by
reason of low power.
 Malicious state (M): a node launches Jellysh or Black hole DoS attack.
{ Jellysh state (J): a node launches Jellysh DoS attack, i.e., a node
delays and fails to forward data packets maliciously.
{ Black hole state (B): a node launches Black hole DoS attack, i.e., a
node broadcasts fake routes to disrupt legitimate path selections.
 Failed state (F ): a node can no longer perform basic functions such as
initiate or response route discoveries.
Jellysh and Black hole attacks are typical DoS attacks in MANETs [25, 26].
The node in Jellysh state can respond to route requests and route replies, but
delays and fails to forward data packets without any reason. The node in Black
hole state sends a fake message when a node requires the route information
immediately, and spoofs the node on the optimal path. Both attacks cause the
node isolation problem for neighbors.
Moreover, a node may be classied into the following states with respect to
the battery:
 Fully charged battery state: The battery is fully charged.
 Low battery state: The battery is low and may cause a failure due to out
of battery.
Based on the above node classication, we consider a CTMC model to de-
scribe the stochastic behavior of a node by combining the states with respect to
the wellness and the battery. Concretely, we suppose that a node may change
its behavior as follows:
 A cooperative node may become a failed node due to energy exhaus-
tion and misconguration. It is apt to become a Malicious node when
it launches DoS attack.
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Figure 3.1: DoS attack model [12].
Fully-charged battery state
Low battery state
Figure 3.2: Power (battery) model.
 A malicious node cannot become a cooperative node again, but may be-
come a failed node.
 A node in failed state may become a cooperative node again after it repairs
and responds to routing requests for others.
 The node may become the low battery state as time passes.
 A node becomes the fully-charged battery state from the low battery state
again by the battery charge.
Figure 3.1 depicts the state transition diagram of DoS attack behavior. The
state cannot visit the cooperative state from neither Jellysh and Black whole
states. Figure 3.2 shows the state transition diagram of a battery.
3.1.2 MRGP modeling
Based on two CTMC models, we consider a composite model by combining two
models with the following model assumptions:
 DoS attack behavior and battery state are independent with each other.
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 All state transitions are occurred by exponential distributions.
However, for the rst assumption, it is evident that the node failure depends
on the state of battery, i.e., the failure rate in the empty battery state should
be greater than that in the fully-charged battery state. Also, though the sec-
ond assumption is useful to simplify the model analysis because the assumption
gives a CTMC model, the battery life time is not exponentially distributed in
general. Thus it is natural that the changes of the battery state are represented
by non-exponential distributions such as deterministic, uniform and normal dis-
tributions. On the other hand, although Xing and Wang [11, 12] considered
the non-exponential state transitions between DoS attack states, they did not
discuss the eect of the state of battery.
This chapter presents a more general state-based model describing a node
behavior. Concretely, we extend a CTMC modeling to an MRGP based mod-
eling . MRGP is a stochastic point process which has both regenerative and
non-regenerative time points [27, 28]. Generally, we consider a stochastic pro-
cess fM(t); t  0g with discrete state space. If M(t) has time points at
which the process stochastically restarts itself, the process is called regenerative,
and the time points are called regeneration points. Otherwise, the time points
when M(t) does not restart are called non-regeneration points. Specically,
when state transition at the regeneration points is governed by a discrete-Time
Markov chain (DTMC), the process M(t) is an MRGP.
In this chapter, we consider the following three battery states:
 Fully charged battery state: The battery is fully charged.
 Low battery state: The battery is low.
 Out of battery: The battery is out and the maintenance is required.
Also, in this chapter, the failed state F is caused by out of battery or exploit
detection. Figure 3.3 illustrates the state transition diagram of our MRGP
model. Three DoS attack states C, S and M are grouped by each battery
state; fully-charged battery and low battery states, while the failed state F is
grouped by an out of battery state. The state transition timings between fully-
charged battery, low battery and out of battery states are dened by general
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Figure 3.3: State transition diagram of MRGP model.
distributions. Let FF;L(t), FL;M (t) and FM;L(t) be cumulative distribution
functions (c.d.f.'s) of the state transition distributions from fully-charged battery
state to low battery state, from low battery state to out of battery state and from
out of battery state to fully-charged battery state, respectively, and they are all
regenerative transitions (dotted lines). On the other hand, the state transitions
among C, S and M are non-regenerative (solid lines), whose transition rates
are denoted by 
(z)
x;y, x; y 2 fC; S;Mg, z 2 fFull, Lowg. In addition, in the
malicious state, the exploit detection rates are 
(z)
M;F , z 2 fFull, Lowg. This
chapter assumes that a simultaneous transition in which both DoS attack and
battery states change does not occur, except for transitions to out of battery
state due to exploit detection and FL;M (t). Also, in Selsh state, the drain on
battery power is reduced, i.e., the clocks of FF;L(t) and FL;M (t) are stopped by
the preemptive resume [28, 30]. In the gure, the states of preemption resume
are located on the lower part of square representing a group of states.
3.2 Survivability Analysis
3.2.1 Denition
In [11, 12], the network survivability is dened as the probability that the
MANET is a k-vertex-connected graph, which is the property that the net-
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work is connected even if fewer than k vertices are deleted. In general, it is
dicult to validate the vertex-connectivity in the graph whose conguration is
dynamically changed such as MANETs. Therefore, Xing and Wang [11, 12] de-
rived the approximate network survivability measure when the number of nodes
is sucient large by considering the connectivity of a node in the MANET.
Consider a MANET M consisting of jMj = N mobile nodes and dene
the node degree D(i) of node i, which means the number of neighbors of node
i. Let Dx(i) be the number of neighbors whose DoS attack states are x 2
fC;S; J;B; Fg. Then the node isolation condition can be described: If DS(i) +
DJ(i) + DF (i) = D(i) or DB(i)  1, then the node i is isolated from the
network [11, 12]. Suppose that the DoS attack states of neighbors are mutually
independent, and let the probability of DoS attack states of a neighbor be Px
(x 2 fC; S; J;B; Fg). The node isolation probability can be obtained as follows.
P (DC(i) = 0jD(i) = d)
= (1 PC PB)
d + 1 (1 PB)
d

: (3.1)
Furthermore, a node being k-connected to a network means that it has k-
cooperative degree which is given by DC(i) = k. Then the k-connected proba-
bility of node i is written by
P (DC(i) = kjD(i) = d)
=

d
k

P kC(1 PC PB)
d k; k  1: (3.2)
According to the network theory, Xing and Wang [11, 12] derived the approx-
imate network survivability as the probability that every node in the active
network has k-connected, namely,
NSk(M)  P ((Na)  k); (3.3)
where Na M is the active network consisting of only cooperative nodes, and
(Na) = minfDC(i); i 2 Nag. Moreover, the upper bound of the probability of
Eq. (3.3) is given by
NSk(M)U = P (DC(i)  k)ND ; (3.4)
and the lower bound:
NSk(M)L = max(0; 1 jN aj(1 P (DC(i)  k))); (3.5)
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where i is an arbitrary node index in the active network and jNaj = N(1 PF ) is
the number of nodes in the active network Na. Also ND is the number of points
whose transmission ranges are mutually disjoint over the MANET area. Let A
and r are the area of MANET and the node transmission radius. The number
of disjoint points is given by ND = N=(r
2) where  is the node density, i.e.,
 = N=A.
The probability P (DC(i)  k) in Eq. (3.5) can be rewritten in the form:
P (DC(i)  k)
=
1X
d=k
P (DC(i)  kjD(i) = d)P (D(i) = d)
=
1X
d=k
dX
n=k
P (DC(i) = njD(i) = d)P (D(i) = d)
=
1X
n=k
1X
d=n
P (DC(i) = njD(i) = d)P (D(i) = d): (3.6)
Since P (DC(i) = njD(i) = d) has already discussed in Eq. (3.1), this chapter
considers two models to derive a closed form of P (D(i) = d).
(i) Poisson Model [11, 12]
The Poisson model is based on the situation whereN mobile nodes are uniformly
placed in the area. The node distribution is assumed to be
P (D(i) = d) =
d
d!
e ; (3.7)
where  = r2N(1 PF )=A. Hence the probability P (DC(i)  k) is given by
P (DC(i)  k) =
1X
n=k
e (PC+PB)
(PC)
n
n!
; k  1: (3.8)
Substituting Eq. (3.8) into Eq. (3.5) yields the upper and lower bounds of net-
work survivability.
(ii) Negative Binomial Model
The negative binomial model utilizes a mixed Poisson distribution instead of
Poisson distribution. Let f() be the distribution of parameter  in the Poisson
model. This implies that the parameter  includes the uncertainty, and that the
node distributions for all disjoint areas have dierent Poisson parameters. The
38 CHAPTER 3. SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS BY MRGP
node distribution can be rewritten by the following mixed Poisson distribution:
P (D(i) = d) =
Z 1
0
e 
d
d!
f()d: (3.9)
For the sake of analytical simplicity, f() is assumed to be the gamma dis-
tribution with mean r2N(1 PF )=A and coecient of variation c. Then we
have
P (D(i) = d) =
(a+ d)
d! (a)

b
1 + b
a
1
1 + b
d
; (3.10)
where a = 1=c2 and b = A=(r2N(1 PF )c
2). It should be noted that Eq. (3.10)
corresponds to the negative binomial p.m.f. with mean r2N(1 PF )=A, and
the variance is greater than the node distribution in the Poisson model. Based
on Eq. (3.10), the probability P (DC(i)  k) is given by
P (DC(i)  k)
=
1X
n=k
(a+ n)
n! (a)

b
PC + PB + b
a
PC
PC + PB + b
d
:
k  1: (3.11)
3.3 MRGP Analysis
To evaluate the network survivabilities in Eqs. (3.8) and (3.11), DoS attack state
probabilities PC and PB should be computed from the MRGP model described
in Section 3.1. In particular, we discuss the stationary analysis and transient
analysis of MRGP model.
3.3.1 Stationary Analysis
In general, we dene a regeneration time sequence T1 < T2 <    and their
time intervals Ti = Ti Ti 1, i = 1; 2; : : : in an MRGP model. Then the
time interval behaves a Markov renewal sequence [31]. Suppose that the time
sequence is time-homogeneous, i.e.,
P (M(Tn) = j;Tn < t j M(Tn 1) = i)
= P (M(T1) = j;T1 < t j M(T0) = i)
 Ki;j(t): (3.12)
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The state probability of MRGP is given by
Vi;j(t) = P (M(t) = j j M(0) = i)
= P (M(t) = j;T1  t j M(0) = i)
+ P (M(t) = j;T1 > t j M(0) = i)
=
X
l
Z t
0
P (M(t u) = j j M(0) = l)dKi;l(u)
+ P (M(t) = j;T1 > t j M(0) = i): (3.13)
LetK(t), V (t) and E(t) denote matrices whose elements are Ki;j(t), Vi;j(t) and
P (M(t) = j;T1 > t j M(0) = i), respectively. We have the Markov renewal
equation for MRGP [27, 32];
V (t) = E(t) +
Z t
0
dK(u)V (t u); (3.14)
where E(t) and K(t) are called local and global kernels.
MRGP is one of the widest stochastic processes which contain renewal struc-
tures, and can represent a variety of stochastic processes by choosing appropri-
ate local and global kernels. According to the MRGP modeling in Section
3.1, we divide the state space into the subspaces SGF , SGF 0 , SGL , SGL0 and SGM .
The subspaces SGF , SGL and SGM consist of the states which are categorized to
fully-charged battery, low battery and out of battery states without preemptive
resume, respectively. The subspaces SGF 0 and SGL0 correspond to the states with
preemptive resume in the fully-charged battery and low battery states. Also,
the CTMC generators caused by non-regenerative transitions are partitioned by
Qx;y, x; y 2 fF; F 0; L; L0;Mg which correspond to the non-regenerative transi-
tion kernel from the subspace SGx to SGy . The row vector AM;F determines
the DoS attack state in SGF when the state transition of FM;F (t) occurs in SGM .
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Then we have the following Markov renewal equations:
V F;F (t)
= exp(SF t)FF;L(t)
+
Z t
0
exp(SFu)V L;F (t u)dFF;L(u)
+
Z t
0
exp(SFu)QF;MV M;F (t u)FF;L(u)du; (3.15)
V F;L(t)
=
Z t
0
exp(SFu)V L;L(t u)dFF;L(u)
+
Z t
0
exp(SFu)QF;MV M;L(t u)FF;L(u)du; (3.16)
V F;M (t)
=
Z t
0
exp(SFu)V L;M (t u)dFF;L(u)
+
Z t
0
exp(SFu)QF;MV M;M (t u)FF;L(u)du; (3.17)
V L;F (t)
=
Z t
0
exp(SLu)V M;F (t u)dFL;M (u)
+
Z t
0
exp(SLu)QL;MV M;F (t u)FL;M (u)du; (3.18)
V L;L(t)
= exp(SLt)FL;M (t)
+
Z t
0
exp(SLu)V M;L(t u)dFL;M (u)
+
Z t
0
exp(SLu)QL;MV M;L(t u)FL;M (u)du; (3.19)
V L;M (t)
=
Z t
0
exp(SLu)V M;M (t u)dFL;M (u)
+
Z t
0
exp(SLu)QL;MV M;M (t u)FL;M (u)du; (3.20)
V M;F (t) =
Z t
0
AM;FV F;F (t u)dFM;F (u); (3.21)
V M;L(t) =
Z t
0
AM;FV F;L(t u)dFM;F (u); (3.22)
V M;M (t) =FM;F (t) +
Z t
0
AM;FV F;M (t u)dFM;F (u); (3.23)
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where in general F (t) = 1 F (t),
SF = QF;F +QF;F 0( QF 0;F 0)
 1QF 0;F ; (3.24)
SL = QL;L +QL;L0( QL0;L0)
 1QL0;L (3.25)
and
V (t) =
0BBB@
V F;F (t) V F;L(t) V F;M
V L;F (t) V L;L(t) V L;M
V M;F (t) V M;L(t) V M;M
1CCCA : (3.26)
Note that the local kernel E(t) is a zero matrix in our model, because there are
no state that has non-regenerative transition only.
The commonly used technique to compute stationary probability in MRGPs
is an embedded Markov chain (EMC) approach [28]. The EMC approach con-
sists of two steps; the steady-state probability on regeneration points and the
computation of cumulative probabilities between two successive regeneration
points.
Dene the following matrices:
P F;L =
Z 1
0
exp(SFu)dFF;L(u); (3.27)
P F;M =
Z 1
0
Z u
0
exp(SF t)dtdFF;L(u)QF;M ; (3.28)
PL;M =
Z 1
0
exp(SLu)dFL;M (u)AL;M
+
Z 1
0
Z u
0
exp(SLt)dtdFL;M (u)QL;M ; (3.29)
PM;F =AM;F : (3.30)
These are submatrices for the probability transition matrix at time points when
regenerative transitions occur. Let EMCF , 
EMC
L and 
EMC
M be the stationary
state probability vectors over SGF , SGL and SGM . Thus we solve the following
balance equation by a numerical technique [29].
EMCF = 
EMC
M PM;F ; (3.31)
EMCL = 
EMC
F P F;L; (3.32)
EMCM = 
EMC
F P F;M + 
EMC
L PL;M : (3.33)
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Next, we compute cumulative probabilities, i.e., expected sojourn time of each
state between two successive regeneration points. Using the steady-state proba-
bility vectors EMCF , 
EMC
L and 
EMC
M , the expected sojourn time are derived
as follows.
sF = 
EMC
F
Z 1
0
Z u
0
exp(SF t)dtdFF;L(u); (3.34)
sF 0 = sFQF;F 0( QF 0;F 0)
 1; (3.35)
sL = 
EMC
L
Z 1
0
Z u
0
exp(SLt)dtdFL;M (u); (3.36)
sL0 = sLQL;L0( QL0;L0)
 1; (3.37)
sL = 
EMC
L
Z 1
0
Z u
0
exp(SLt)dtdFL;M (u); (3.38)
sM = 
EMC
M
Z 1
0
udFM;F (u): (3.39)
The Markov renewal reward theory [31] gives the steady-state probability of
MRGP as a fraction of the expected sojourn time for each state over the total
time;
F =
sF
sF1+ sF 0 + sL1+ sL0 + sM
; (3.40)
F 0 =
sF 0
sF1+ sF 0 + sL1+ sL0 + sM
; (3.41)
L =
sL
sF1+ sF 0 + sL1+ sL0 + sM
; (3.42)
L0 =
sL0
sF1+ sF 0 + sL1+ sL0 + sM
; (3.43)
M =
sM
sF1+ sF 0 + sL1+ sL0 + sM
; (3.44)
where 1 is a column vector that every element is 1. The matrix exponential forms
of Eqs. (3.34) through (3.39) can be computed by uniformization technique (see
Appendix 1). Finally, we can obtain the state probabilities PB and PC by
summing the corresponding elements in F and L.
3.3.2 Transient Analysis
PH (phase-type) expansion is one of the most popular methods for the transient
analysis of MRGP. The idea of PH expansion is to replace general distributions
in MRGP with approximate PH distributions, and it can reduce the original
MRGP to an approximate CTMC.
The PH distribution is dened as the time to absorption in a nite Markov
chain with one absorbing state. Strictly speaking, the PH distribution is clas-
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sied into continuous and discrete PH distributions. This chapter deals with
continuous PH distribution. If we let T be the transition rates between transient
states and  be the exit rates from transient states to the absorbing state, with-
out loss of generality, the innitesimal generator D of continuous-time Markov
chain is assumed to be partitioned as follows:
D =
0@ T 
0 0
1A ; (3.45)
For the transient states, we set  be an initial probability vector. The
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) and the probability density function
(p.d.f.) of PH distribution are dened by
FPH(t) = 1  exp(T t)1; fPH(t) =  exp(T t); (3.46)
where 1 is a column vector that every element is 1. Note that the exit rate
vector is given by  = T1. We call the transient states phases.
The PH distribution has several sub-classes according to the structure of T
(see e.g. [33]). In particular, the acyclic PH distribution (APH) is the widest
class among mathematically tractable PH distributions. Cumani [34] derived
the canonical forms (CFs) as the minimal representation of APH, which has the
smallest number of free parameters. The CF1 (canonical form 1) is dened by
 =

1 2    m

; (3.47)
T =
0BBBBBBBBB@
1 1
2 2
. . .
. . .
m 1 m 1
m
1CCCCCCCCCA
;  =
0BBBBBBBBB@
0
...
m
1CCCCCCCCCA
; (3.48)
where i  0,
Pm
i=1 i = 1 and 0 < 1      m.
The st step of PH expansion is to approximate general distributions with
PH distributions. The commonly used techniques of PH approximation are mo-
ment match, least square method of the dierence of p.d.f.'s and ML estimation.
The ML estimation is widely used for the parameter estimation of general
distributions, and has useful properties like asymptotic consistency and normal-
ity. Some authors have been discussed the ML estimation of PH distribution
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[35, 36, 37, 38]. The ML estimates of PH distribution are derived so that the
mode matches the theoretical one. According to [37], this paper uses the PH
tting based on ML estimation. Roughly speaking, ML estimation uses the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. Therefore we directly apply the KL diver-
gence as a criterion of function tting.
Given an arbitrary probability density function f(t), the KL divergence
KL(f; g) between f(t) and any probability density function g(t) is dened by
KL(f; g) =
Z 1
0
f(t) log
f(t)
g(t)
dt
=
Z 1
0
f(t) log f(t)dt
Z 1
0
f(t) log g(t)dt: (3.49)
The problem is to nd g(t) maximizing
R1
0
f(t) log g(t)dt. Applying a suitable
numerical integration technique, we have
Z 1
0
f(t) log g(t)dt 
KX
i=1
wi log g(ti); (3.50)
where wi, including f(ti), is a weight. The discretized points and their associ-
ated weights are determined by the numerical quadrature. Eq. (3.50) indicates
that ML estimation is one approximation form of the KL divergence. Thus
we can obtain a approximate PH distribution by using the weighted samples
(t1; w1); : : : ; (tK ; wK) (see Appendix 2).
Finally we apply the EM algorithm to derive the ML estimates for PH dis-
tribution [37]. The EM algorithm proposed in [37] further improves the com-
putation speed of the EM algorithm by Asmussen et al. [36] with respect to
the number of phases, though both algorithms are based on forward-backward
computation [39, 40]. Since this method utilizes sparsity of the generator T ,
the computation speed is drastically reduced for estimating CF1.
This chapter utilizes PH expansion of MRGP based on the Kronecker rep-
resentation, which is often used to represent a superposition of Markov models
[41]. The general distributions FF;L(t), FL;M (t) and FM;F (t) are approximated
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by
FF;L(t)  1 F exp(T F t)1F ;
fF;L(t)  F exp(T F t)F ; (3.51)
FL;M (t)  1 L exp(TLt)1L;
fL;M (t)  L exp(TLt)L; (3.52)
FM;F (t)  1 M exp(TM t)1M ;
fM;F (t)  M exp(TM t)M : (3.53)
Then the MRGP process M(t) can be approximated by the CTMC with the
following innitesimal generator:
V
PH
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
QF;F  TF QF;F 0 
 I AF;L 
 (FL) QF;M 
 (1FM )
Q
F 0;F 
 I QF 0;F 0 
 I
QL;L  TL QL;L0 
 I
AL;M
(LM )
+QL;M
(1LM )
Q
L0;L 
 I QL0;L0 
 I
AM;F 
 (MF ) TM
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
(3.54)
where 
 and  are Kronecker product and sum, respectively. The approximate
transient probability vector ofM(t) can be derived by summing the correspond-
ing elements of the following probability vector
(F (0)
 1TF ; F 0(0)
 1TF ;L(0)
 1TL;
L0(0)
 1TL; M (0)
 1TM ) exp(V PHt); (3.55)
where 1T is the transpose of vector 1.
3.4 Numerical Examples
3.4.1 Stationary Analysis
In this section, we investigate the network survivability in the MRGP model. We
set the following model parameters, which are based on the simulation results
in [12]:
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Fully-charged battery state:
C;S = 1=240:0 [1/sec]; S;C = 1=60:0 [1/sec];
M;F = 1=50:0 [1/sec]; C;M = 1=6.0e+6 [1/sec];
pB = 0:1; pJ = 0:9;
fF;L(t) = Gamma(t; 5:0; 5:0=24000):
Low battery state:
C;S = 1=60:0 [1/sec]; S;C = 1=240:0 [1/sec];
M;F = 1=50:0 [1/sec]; C;M = 1=6.0e+6 [1/sec];
pB = 0:1; pJ = 0:9;
fL;M (t) = Gamma(t; 2:0; 2:0=1000):
Out of battery (maintenance) state:
fM;F (t) = Uniform(t; 30; 90);
where Gamma(t; ; ) and Uniform(t; ; ) are gamma and uniform p.d.f.'s:
Gamma(t; a; b) =
bata 1e bt
(a)
; t  0; (3.56)
Uniform(t;min;max) =
1
max min
; min  t  max: (3.57)
Also, pB is the probability that a node launches Black hole DoS attack, and
pJ is the probability that a node launches Jellysh DoS attack when the node
becomes the malicious state. Moreover, we determine the network parameters
as follows.
 A = 1000 (m) 1000 (m): the area of MANET.
 N = 500: the number of mobile nodes.
 r = 100 (m): transmission radius of a node.
Under the above model parameters, the node probabilities in steady state
are given by
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Fully-charged battery state:
PC = 0:6847; PS = 0:1712; PB = 5:694e-7;
PJ = 5:125e-6:
Low battery state:
PC = 2:848e-2; PS = 0:1139; PB = 2:373e-8;
PJ = 2:136e-7:
Out of battery state:
PF = 1:716e-3:
Since we assume that the transition rate from cooperative state to selsh state
in low battery state is higher than that in fully-charged battery state, the steady
state probability of the selsh state in low battery state is also high. According
to the above stationary state probabilities, the upper and lower bounds of 1-
connected network survivability of Poisson model are given by NSk(M)PU =
0:9993 and NSk(M)PL = 0:9884. On the other hand, the upper and lower
bounds of 1-connected network survivability of negative binomial model are
NSk(M)NBU = 0:06545 and NSk(M)NBL = 0, where the coecient of variation
(CV) is set as c = 1:0. The essential dierence between Poisson and negative
binomial models is the bias of the number of mobile nodes in a local area.
That is, the Poisson model means that the number of nodes in a local area
is close to a constant, compared to that of negative binomial model. In fact,
when c = 0:01, the upper and lower bounds of network survivability of negative
binomial model are NSk(M)NBU = 0:9989 and NSk(M)NBL = 0:9829 which are
close to those of Poisson model. To investigate the eect of CV of the number
of nodes on the network survivability, we perform the sensitivity analysis of the
network survivability on the CV c in the negative binomial model. Figure 3.4
illustrates the upper bound of network survivability in the negative binomial
model with varying c, where x-axis and y-axis indicate the CV and the upper
bound of network survivability, respectively. From this gure, it can be seen
that the network survivability is sensitive to the CV of the number of neighbors
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Figure 3.4: Upper bound of 1-connected network survivability in negative bino-
mial model.
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Figure 3.5: Upper bound of 1-connected network survivability with varying the
number of nodes.
regardless of the number of total nodes. In all cases, the network survivability
gets worse as CV increases. This implies that it is important to \uniformly"
place mobile nodes to whole the MANET area in order to maintain high network
survivability.
Next we investigate the relationship between the number of total nodes and
the network survivability. Figure 3.5 shows the upper bounds of 1-connected
network survivability with varying the number of mobile nodes in whole the
MANET area. From the gure, we nd that the number of nodes exponentially
aects the network survivability, which is the same conclusion as [12], and that
the curve rapidly increases when the CV is small. Similar to the previous
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Figure 3.6: The expected life of battery.
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Figure 3.7: Bounds of 1-connected network survivability with varying the coop-
erative time fraction in low battery state.
insights, if mobile nodes are unevenly located to geographical areas, the network
survivability becomes low even if a large number of mobile nodes are placed.
In our modeling, we can derive the expected life of battery by computing
the expected cycle time from fully-charged battery state to out of battery state.
Therefore, dissimilar to [19], we can examine the eect of selsh behavior on the
battery life as well as the network survivability. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the
expected life of battery and the upper and lower bounds of network survivability
in Poisson model with varying the time fraction of sojourn time of cooperative
state over that of selsh state in the low battery state. That is, the transition
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rates in the low battery state are redened as follows.
C;S =
1
300:0fa
; S;C =
1
300:0(1 fa)
; 0 < fa < 1: (3.58)
If fa is close to 0, the node spends in selsh state for almost all time in low
battery state. Also, in Fig. 3.6, we indicate the expected life of battery when
nodes do not go to selsh state, which is labeled by `without selsh'. From
Fig. 3.6, the expected life of battery exponentially grows as the cooperative
time fraction is close to 0. However, the expected life of battery does not
change around at 0.1 time fraction. On the other hand, from Fig. 3.7, it can
be found that the network survivability becomes low as the cooperative time
fraction decreases. In particular, when the cooperative time fraction is less
than 0.1, the upper and lower bounds of network survivability rapidly decrease.
This indicates that there is a tradeo between the battery life and network
survivability.
3.4.2 Transient Analysis
According to PH expansion described in Section 3.3, we examine the transient
analysis of node state and derive the corresponding network survivability of
MANET. We utilize the model parameters which are set in the stationary anal-
ysis.
First we describe the PH approximation for the distributions FF;L(t), FL;M (t)
and FM;L. In fact, since gamma distributions with integer shape parameters
are a concrete class of PH distributions, FF;L(t) and FL;M (t) are originally rep-
resented by PH distributions. However, in order to examine the approximation
performance of PH expansion, we apply the weighted sample-based PH approx-
imation to all the distributions. Based on the weighted samples derived by DE
formulas (see Appendix 2), we estimate PH parameters for FF;L(t), FL;M (t)
and FM;F (t) with 10, 10 and 1000 phases, respectively. Figures 3.8 through
3.10 present the p.d.f.'s of original gamma and uniform distributions and the
approximate PH distributions. In Figs. 3.8 and 3.9, the p.d.f.'s of approximate
PH distributions are drawn by dots, because the p.d.f.'s of PH distributions are
close to the original density functions so that they cannot be recognized. From
Figs. 3.8 and 3.9, we see that the PH approximation for FF;L(t) and FL;M (t)
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Figure 3.8: PH approximation for FF;L(t).
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Figure 3.9: PH approximation for FL;M (t).
is accurate. This is because the gamma distributions with integer shape pa-
rameters are involved by acyclic PH distributions. Also, from Fig. 3.10, PH
approximation works well for a uniform distribution by using a large number of
phases.
Figures 3.11 through 3.13 illustrate the transient behavior of node proba-
bility which is approximated by PH distributions. In particular, we set the
following state probability vectors as the initial probability vectors at t = 0:
Case 1: The probability vector just after the node becomes the cooperative
state (Fig. 3.11).
Case 2: the probabilities of all the state, including phases of PH distributions
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Figure 3.11: Transient state probabilities (Case 1).
the initial probability, are assigned to an equivalent value (Fig. 3.12).
Case 3: The probability vector just after the node becomes the failed state
(Fig. 3.13).
The transient behavior of state probabilities strongly depends on the initial
state probabilities. However, in all the results, the state probabilities converge
to steady state probabilities after 200 to 300 seconds. Also, in Fig. 3.13, we nd
that the state suddenly changes in the range t 2 [30; 90]. This is an evidence
that the PH approximates the original uniform distribution very well.
Finally, Fig. 3.14 depicts the upper and lower bounds of network survivabil-
ity in Poisson model by substituing the transient state probabilities in Case 1.
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Figure 3.12: Transient state probabilities (Case 2).
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Figure 3.13: Transient state probabilities (Case 3).
Since the initial probabiity vector of Case 1 indicates that node is cooperative
with probability 1, the network survivability also becomes high. However, the
network survivability gradually decreases as time elapses, because the probabil-
ity that the node is in selsh state increases. Similar to the node probability,
the network survivability almost converges to the steady state after 200{300 sec-
onds. This means that, even if any accident occurs in the network, the network
connectivity becomes stable 200{300 seconds later after the recovery is nished.
Such an analysis leads to another network survivability discussed in [5].
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Figure 3.14: Transient 1-connected network survivability (Case 1).
3.5 APPENDIX 1
The uniformization approach is eective to compute the matrix exponential
in the Markov analysis [42, 43]. Let F;L(v) and L;F (v) be the p.m.f.'s of
mixed Poisson distribution with mixture probabilities FF;L(t) and FL;F (t), re-
spectively:
F;L(v) =
Z 1
0
e qFu
(qFu)
v
v!
dFF;L(u); (3.59)
L;F (v) =
Z 1
0
e qLu
(qLu)
v
v!
dFL;F (u); (3.60)
where qF and qL are maximum values of absolute diagonal elements of QF and
QL. Using the p.m.f.'s, the matrix exponential form can be rewritten by
~QF =
1X
v=0
F (v)(I +QF =qF )
v;
~QL =
1X
v=0
L(v)(I +QL=qL)
v; (3.61)
F =
1
qF
1X
v=0
vX
s=0
F (v)
EMC
F (I +QF =qF )
v; (3.62)
L =
1
qL
1X
v=0
vX
s=0
L(v)
EMC
L (I +QL=qL)
v: (3.63)
The innite sums may be truncated by left truncation point L and right trun-
cation point R such that
RX
v=L
F (v)  1 ;
RX
v=L
L(v)  1 ; (3.64)
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where  is a tolerance error.
3.6 APPENDIX 2
This chapter utilizes the method to generate the weighted samples based on the
double exponential (DE) formula [44]. This approach provides more accurate
approximation to many types of integral functions, compared to trapezoidal
rule, Simpson's rule, etc. The DE formula changes the original integration to an
innite integration of the function which decays according to double exponential
function. Here we use the following function
(x) = exp

2
sinh(x)

: (3.65)
By substituting the above function to
R1
0
f(t) log g(t)dt, the integration is trans-
formed to Z 1
0
f(t) log g(t)dt =
Z 1
 1
f((x)) log g((x))0(x)dx; (3.66)
where 0(x) is the rst derivative of (x). Applying the trapezoidal rule to the
above integration, we haveZ 1
 1
f((x)) log g((x))0(x)dx

K+X
i=K 
h0(ih)f((ih)) log g((ih)); (3.67)
where h is a step size and K+(= K ) is a upper (lower) limit of discretization
points. In fact, the accuracy of integration can be controlled by the parame-
ters h and K+. That is, given h and K+, we generate the weighted samples
(t1; w1); : : : ; (tK ; wK) as follows
ti K +1 = (ih) (3.68)
wi K +1 = h0(ih)f((ih)); (3.69)
i = K ; : : : ; 0; : : : ;K+;
where K = K+ K  + 1.

Chapter 4
Survivability Analysis for
Power-Aware MANETs
with Battery Charge
Network survivability is an attribute that network is continually available even
if a communication failure occurs, and is regarded as one of the most impor-
tant concepts to design dependable computer networks. In the existing work,
a power-aware MANET is described by an MRGP, and takes account of the
variability in power level, which is caused by the possible low-battery state in
each communication node. However, it implicitly ignores eects by the so-called
border eects, and lacks the reality in modeling. In this chapter, we revisit a
power-aware MANET model taking account of border eects and quantify the
network survivability more accurately.
4.1 Model Description
4.1.1 Node Classication
Since nodes in MANETs cooperate with the routing processes to maintain net-
work connectivity, each of nodes is designed as it behaves autonomously, but
its discipline to require, send and receive the route information, is dened as a
strict protocol. At the same time, it is also important to dene the protocol
in order to prevent propagation of the erroneous route information caused by
malicious attacks. Xing and Wang [12] consider a MANET that suers such a
malicious attack, whose node states are dened as follows:
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 Cooperative state (C): a node complies with all routing and forwarding
rules.
 Selsh state (S): a node may not forward control or data packets for
others for the sake of power saving.
 Malicious state (M): a node launches Jellysh or Black hole DoS attack.
{ Jellysh state (J): a node being cooperative in the routing stage
reluctant in forwarding data packets.
{ Blackhole state (B): a node disrupting legitimate path selections by
broadcasting fakes route replies.
 Failed state (F ): a node is unable to initiate or response route discoveries.
Moreover, each node may be classied into the following states in terms of the
battery state:
 Fully charged battery state (H): the battery is fully charged.
 Low battery state (L): the battery level is low and may cause a failure
due to out of power.
It is essential to characterize the power state in power-aware device. The mod-
eling approach in Chapter 3 can be considered an incremental in technique but
signicant extension in reality. For common DoS attacks, the node in Jelly-
sh attack receives route requests and route replies. The main mechanism of
Jellysh state is to delay packets without any reason. On the other hand, the
node in Blackhole attack can respond a node with a fake message immediately
by declaring as it is in the optimal path or as it is only one-hop away to other
nodes.
Suppose that each of states, i = C;S;M , has one of two sub-states; H and
L. For instance, iH means a node in the state i with high energy level and iL
means a node in the state i with low energy level. The failed state F also has
one of two sub-states; energy exhaustion (EF ) and DoS attack detection (DF ).
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4.1.2 Semi-Markov Node Model
Based on the above node classication, we consider a semi-Markov model to
describe the stochastic behavior of a node by combining the network state and
the battery state. We dene the node behavior as follows:
 A Cooperative node (CH or CL) may become a Malicious node (MH or
ML) when it launches DoS attack, and a low-battery Cooperative node
(CL) may become a Failed node due to energy exhaustion (EF ).
 A Cooperative node (CH or CL) may become a Selsh node (SH or SL)
for saving the power.
 A Malicious (MH or ML) node cannot become a Cooperative node (CH
or CL) again, but may become a Failed node by two reasons: energy
exhaustion (EF ) and DoS attack detection (DF ).
 A node in Failed state (DF or EF ) may become a Cooperative node (CH)
again after it repairs and responds to routing requests for others.
 Each node may become the low battery state as operating time passes,
but may become fully-charged battery state from the low battery state
again by re-charge.
From above assumptions, we can dene the state space S 2 fCH;CL; SH; SL;
MH;ML;EF;DFg, and the time-dependent transition rates from state i to
state j (i; j 2 S) by i;j(t).
Similar to the original idea by Xing and Wang [12], we describe the transition
behavior of each node, by a stochastic process fZ(t); t  0g, associated with the
space S. Let Xn denote the state at transition time tn. Dene
Pr(Xn+1 = xn+1jX0 = x0:; ; ; Xn = xn)
= Pr(Xn+1 = xn+1jXn = xn); (4.1)
where xi 2 S for 0  i  n + 1. From Eq. (4.1), the stochastic process fXn,
n = 0; 1; 2; :::g constitutes a CTMC with state space S, when all the transition
times are exponentially distributed. However, since the transition time from one
state to another state is subject to the time-inhomogeneous behavior of a node,
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Figure 4.1: State transition diagram.
it is not realistic to characterize all the transition times by only exponentially
distributed random variables. For instance, if a sensor node is more inclined
to fail due to energy consumption as the operating time passes, and the less
residual energy is left, then the more likely a sensor changes its behavior to
selsh. This implies that the future action of a node may depend on how long
it has been in the current state and that the transition time intervals should
obey arbitrary probability distributions.
From the above reasons it is common to assume a SMP for fZ(t); t  0g to
describe the node behavior transitions, which is dened by
Z(t) = Xn; 8tn  t  tn+1: (4.2)
Letting Tn = tn+1 tn be the sojourn time between the n-th and (n + 1)-st
transitions, we dene the associated SMP kernel Q = (Qij(t)) by
Qij(t) = Pr(Xn+1 = j; Tn  tjXn = i) = pijFij(t); (4.3)
where pij =limt!1Qij(t) is the transition probability between state i and j
(i; j = ch; cl; sh; sl;mh;ml; ef; df) corresponding to S, and Fij(t) = Pr(Tn <
tjXn+1 = j;Xn = i) is the transition time distribution from state i to j. Fig-
ure 4.1 illustrates the transition diagram of the homogeneous SMP, fZ(t); t  0g,
under consideration, which is somewhat dierent from the MRGP in [16]. By us-
ing the Laplace-Stieltjes transform (LST) we can obtain analytically the steady-
state probability of each node (see Appendix in this chapter).
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4.2 Quantitative Network Survivability
4.2.1 Network Survivability Measures
In a MANET, the transmission of a packet from one node to another node must
go through any path which is made by its neighbor nodes. Since the topology
of a MANET keeps changing dynamically due to many reasons, such as node
mobility, even when node failures or DoS attacks do not occur, it is dicult
to clarify the connected topology for the MANET. Since the communication
availability of a MANET depends on the existing paths between two nodes, it
is intuitively understood that the network survivability strongly depends on the
connectivity. In general, it is said that the MANET is k-connected, if there are
at least k disjoint communication paths connecting one node to the other node.
When k = 1, it means the probability that there is at least one communication
path connecting one node to the other node, and is equivalent to the network
reliability. Hence, thinking of higher network survivability is reduced to highly
dependable MANET design.
Given a MANET M, let (M) denote the vertex-connectivity of M. Based
on the denition of connectivity, the network survivability of M, denoted by
NSk(M), is dened as the probability that all active (survived) nodes are k-
connected [12], i.e.,
NSk(M) = Pr((Ma) = k); (4.4)
where Ma is a sub-network of M and includes all active nodes of M. In
the above denition, we need to nd all the possible paths between arbitrary
node pairs in a MANET. Unfortunately, it is very dicult to enumerate all the
communication paths between arbitrary two nodes especially in a large-scaled
MANET. For this state-explosion problem, we employ an approximate method
to derive the network survivability. For a geometric graph G with N vertices,
dene the minimum node degree as the minimum number of neighbor nodes of
one node in G by (G) and vertex-connectivity of G by (G), respectively. It turns
out that (G)  (G), i.e., the network connectivity is no longer greater than
the minimum number of neighbors of any node. When N is suciently large,
the probability that G is k-connected approximately equals to the probability
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that every vertex has at least k neighbors. So, it is immediate to see that
Pr((G) = k)  Pr((G)  k): (4.5)
However, it should be noted that every neighbor does not always provide
eective outgoing paths, because only the cooperative neighbor can transmit
a packet for other node. Hence, a necessary condition for a MANET to be
k-connected is that every node has at least k cooperative degree. Let (M)
denote the minimum of the cooperative degree of all nodes in a MANET M.
Then, we have
Pr((M) = k)  Pr((M)  k): (4.6)
Remind that the network survivability is dened as the probability that all
active nodes are k-connected to M, so that the quantitative survivability of M
can be given by
NSk(M)  Pr((Ma)  k): (4.7)
An immediate eect of node misbehaviors and failures in MANETs is the
node isolation problem [12]. It is a direct cause for network partitioning, and
eventually aects the network survivability. The node isolation problem is
caused by four types of neighbor; Failed, Selsh, Jellysh and Blackhole nodes.
If all the neighbors of a node are Failed nodes, Selsh nodes or Jellysh nodes,
then it can no longer communicate with other nodes. On the other hand, if one
of neighbors is Blackhole, it gives the other node a faked one-hope path, and
can always shutdown the communication. In this case, it is said that the node
is isolated by the Blackhole neighbor. Furthermore, if there exists a Blackhole
node, then the minimum cooperative degree (Ma) of network Ma becomes 0,
and the network survivability is always reduced to 0.
To formulate the above isolation problem, we dene the node degree D(u)
for node u by the maximum number of neighbors [13]. Let D(i;u) be the number
of node u's neighbors at state i 2 fc; s; j; b; fg corresponding to fC; S; J;B; Fg.
Then the isolation problem in our model can be formulated as follows: Given
node u with degree d, i.e., D(u) = d, ifD(s;u) +D(f;u) +D(j;u) = d orD(b;u)  1,
the cooperative degree is zero, i.e.,D(c;u) = 0, and u is isolated from the network,
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so it holds that
Pr(D(c;u) = 0jD(u) = d) = 1 (1 Pb)d + (1 Pc Pb)d; (4.8)
where Pc is the steady-state probability of a node in a Cooperative state and
Pb is the steady-state probability of a node launching Blackhole attacks. In
Appendix, we give the steady-state probability in our SMP model.
Hereafter, a node is said to be k-connected to a network if its associated
cooperative degree is given by k ( 1). Given node u with degree d, i.e., D(u)
= d, u is said to be k-connected to the network if the cooperative degree is k,
i.e. D(c;u) = k, which holds only if u has no Blackhole neighbor and has exactly
k Cooperative neighbors, i.e., D(b;u) = 0 and D(c;u) = k, respectively. Then it
is straightforward to see that
Pr(D(c;u) = kjD(u) = d) =

d
k

(Pc)
k(1 Pc Pb)
d k: (4.9)
Strictly speaking, it is still dicult to nd the probability distribution of
(Ma)  k in Eq. (4.7). Xing and Wang [12] derive approximately the low
and upper bounds of network survivability instead when the number of nodes is
suciently large by considering the network connectivity of a node in a MANET.
The upper and lower bounds of network survivability are given by
NSk(M)U = (Pr(D(c;u)  k))ND ; (4.10)
NSk(M)L = max(0; 1 E[Na](Pr(D(c;u) < k))); (4.11)
respectively, where u is an arbitrary node index in the active network Ma. In
Eq. (4.11), E[Na] = bN(1 Pf )c is the expected number of active nodes in the
network, where bxc is the maximum integer less than x, Pf is the steady-state
probability of a Failed node, and N denotes the total number of mobile nodes.
In Eq. (4.10), ND is the number of node points whose transmission ranges are
mutually disjoint over the MANET area. Let A and r be the area of MANET
and the node transmission radius, respectively. The number of disjoint points
is given by ND = bN=(r2)c, where  = N=A is the node density.
Next, we give an approximate form of the network survivability based on the
expected number of active nodes [15]. Getting help from the graph theory, the
expected network survivability is approximately given by the probability that
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the active node in the network is k-connected:
NSk(M)E 

1 Pr(D(c;u) < k)
	E[Na]
: (4.12)
By the well-known total probability law, we have
Pr(D(c;u) < k) =
NX
d=k
Pr(D(c;u) < kjD(u) = d) Pr(D(u) = d); (4.13)
so that we need to nd the explicit forms of Pr(D(c;u) < kjD(u) = d) and
Pr(D(u) = d). From Eqs. (4.8) and (4.9), it is easy to obtain
Pr(D(c;u) < kjD(u) = d)
=1 (1 Pb)
d +
k 1X
m=0

d
m

Pmc (1 Pc Pb)
d m
=1 (1 Pb)
d +
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb); (4.14)
where Bm denotes the multinomial probability mass function.
Since the node distribution Pr(D(u) = d) strongly depends on the model
property, we introduce three specic stochastic models [15] in the following:
(i) Poisson Model [12]
Suppose that N mobile nodes in a MANET are uniformly distributed over a
2-dimensional square with area A. The node transmission radius, denoted by r,
is assumed to be identical for all nodes. To derive the node degree distribution
Pr(D(u) = d), we divide the area intoN small grids virtually, so that the grid size
has the same order as the physical size of a node. Consider the case where the
network area is much larger than the physical node size. Then, the probability
that a node occupies a specic grid, denoted by p, is very small. With large N
and small p, the node distribution can be modeled by the Poisson distribution:
Pr(D(u) = d) =
d
d!
e ; (4.15)
where  = r2, and  = E[Na]=A is the node density depending on the un-
derlying model. Finally, substituting Eqs. (4.13)-(4.15) into Eqs. (4.10)-(4.12)
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yields
NSk(M)PU =

e Pb

1
(k; Pc)
(k)
ND
; (4.16)
NSk(M)PL =1 E[Na]

1

e Pb

1
(k; Pc)
(k)

; (4.17)
NSk(M)PE =

e Pb

1
(k; Pc)
(k)
E[Na]
; (4.18)
where (x) = (x 1)!and (h; x) = ( h 1)!e x
Ph 1
l=0 x
l=l! are the complete
and incomplete gamma functions, respectively.
(ii) Binomial Model [15]
It is evident that the Poisson model just focuses on an ideal situation of mobile
nodes. In other words, it is not always easy to measure the physical parameters
such as r and A in practice. Let p denote the probability that each node is
assigned into a communicate network area of a node. For the expected number
of activate nodes E[Na], we describe the node distribution by the binomial
distribution:
Pr(D(u) = d) =

E[Na]
d

pd(1 p)E[Na] d
= Bd(E[Na]; p); (4.19)
where Bd is the binomial probability mass function. Substituting Eq. (4.19)
into Eqs. (4.10)-(4.12) yields alternative formulas of the network survivability:
NSk(M)BU =
8<:
E[Na]X
k=0
Bd(E[Na]; p)
"
(1 Pb)
d
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb)
#)E[ND]
; (4.20)
NSk(M)BL =1 E[Na]
 
1
8<:
E[Na]X
k=0
Bd(E[Na]; p)
"
(1 Pb)
d
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb)
#)!
; (4.21)
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NSk(M)BE =
8<:
E[Na]X
k=0
Bd(E[Na]; p)
"
(1 Pb)
d
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb)
#)E[Na]
: (4.22)
If each node is assigned into a communication network area of a node with
probability p = r2=A, then the corresponding binomial model results a dierent
survivability measure.
(iii) Negative Binomial Model [15]
The negative binomial model comes from a mixed Poisson distribution instead
of Poisson distribution. Let f() be the distribution of parameter  in the Pois-
son model. This implicitly assumes that the parameter  includes uncertainty,
and that the node distributions for all disjoint areas have dierent Poisson pa-
rameters. Then the node distribution can be represented by the following mixed
Poisson distribution:
P (D(u) = d) =
Z 1
0
e 
d
d!
f()d: (4.23)
For the sake of analytical simplicity, let f() be the gamma probability density
function with mean r2N(1 Pf )=A and coecient of variation c. Then we
have
P (D(u) = d) =
(a+ d)
d! (a)

b
1 + b
a
1
1 + b
d
= d(a; b); (4.24)
where a = b1=c2c and b = bA=(r2N(1 Pf )c2)c. It should be noted that
Eq. (4.24) corresponds to the negative binomial probability mass function with
mean r2N(1 Pf )=A, and that the variance is greater than that in the Pois-
son model. From Eq. (4.24), we can obtain alternative representations of the
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network survivability with an additional model parameter c.
NSk(M)NBU =
8<:
E[Na]X
k=0
d(a; b)
"
(1 Pb)
d
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb)
#)E[ND]
; (4.25)
NSk(M)NBL =1 E[Na]
 
1
8<:
E[Na]X
k=0
d(a; b)
"
(1 Pb)
d
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb)
#)!
; (4.26)
NSk(M)NBE =
8<:
E[Na]X
k=0
d(a; b)
h
(1 Pb)
d
k 1X
m=0
Bm(d; Pc; 1 Pc Pb)
#)E[Na]
: (4.27)
4.3 Border Eects of Network Communication
Area
The results on network survivability presented in Section 4.2 are based on a non-
informative assumption that network area A has a node density  = E[Na]=A.
This means that the expected number of neighbors of a node in a MANET has
the same value as r2. In other words, such an assumption is not realistic in
real world network communication circumstance. It is well recognized that the
border eects tend to decrease both the communication coverage and the node
degree of a node, which reect the whole network availability. Laranjeira and
Rodrigues [17] show that the relative average node degree for nodes in borders
is independent of the node transmission range and of the overall network node
density in a square communication area. Bettsetetter [18] calculates the average
node degree for nodes in borders for a circular communication area. We apply
their results directly to revisit the network survivability measures in Eqs. (4.10)-
(4.12).
Given a square area of side L, the expected number of neighbors of a node
in a MANET is given by [17]:
s =
r2
L2
; (4.28)
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where  = (L 2r)2 + 3:07492r(L 2r) + 2:461344r2. For the circular area A
with radius R, Bettsettter [18] obtains the expected node degree of a node c
in a circular communicate area:
c =
Na
2

4(1 r^2) arcsin
r^
2
+ 2r^2 (2r^ + r^3)
r
1
r^2
4

; (4.29)
where r^ = r=R. The above formula can be further simplied by using Taylor
series as
c  Nar^2

1
4r^
3

: (4.30)
By replacing the square border eect parameter  in Eqs. (4.16)-(4.18), (4.20)-
(4.22), and (4.24)-(4.26) by s in Eq. (4.28), we obtain the improved network
survivability measures taking account of square border eects. Also, using c
in Eq. (4.30), we derive the network survivability measures in a circular com-
municate area as well.
4.4 Numerical Examples
4.4.1 Comparison of Network Survivability
In our numerical experiments, we set model parameters as follows:
CH;CL(t) = MH;ML = Gamma(t; 5; 1=600);
CH;MH(t) = CL;ML(t) = SH;MH(t) = Exp(t; 1=6e+7);
CH;SH(t) = Exp(t; 1=720:0); CL;EF (t) = Gamma(t; 2; 1=900);
CL;SL(t) = SH;CH(t) = Exp(t; 1=180);
MH;DF (t) = ML;DF (t) = Exp(t; 1=480);
SL;CL(t) = Exp(t; 1=360); SL;ML(t) = Exp(t; 1=6e+7);
DF;CH(t) = Uniform(t; 30; 120); EF;CH(t) = Uniform(t; 30; 90);
pB = 0:1; pJ = 0:9;
where pB and pJ are the Blackhole attack ratio and the Jellysh attack ratio of
DoS attack. Exp, Gamma and Uniform are exponential, gamma and uniform
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p.d.f.'s :
Exp(t; x) = xe xt; t  0; (4.31)
Gamma(t; a; b) =
bata 1e bt
(a)
; t  0; (4.32)
Uniform(t;min;max) =
1
max min
; min  t  max : (4.33)
To analyze the eect of battery re-charge, we consider three cases of transi-
tion time from low battery states (CL; SL;ML) to fully charged battery states
(CH;SH;MH):
Case (1) : (iL);(iH)(t) = Gamma(t; 2; 1=2400);
Case (2) : (iL);(iH)(t) = Exp(t; 1=4800);
Case (3) : (iL);(iH)(t) = 0; i 2 fC; S;Mg;
where (iL);(iH)(t) = 0 in Case (3) denotes that there is no battery re-charge in
the MANET.
Suppose the following network parameter:
 A = 1000 (m) 1000 (m).
To compare several stochastic models with dierent combination; three node
degree models (Poisson, binomial and negative binomial), the lower and upper
bounds versus an approximate network survivability, existence of border eects,
we consider Case 1, and change the transition radius from r = 80 to r = 130
and connectivity requirement from k = 1 to k = 3. The comparative results are
shown in Table 4.1. From this table, we can see that the dierence between three
node degree models of network survivability is very small for the specic values
of r and k. For example, when r = 120 and k = 1, the dierence among three
models are less than 0.0003 for the lower and upper bounds and the approximate
network survivability. Then, we attempt to understand the dierences among
three node degree models with three battery charge cases. The results are shown
in Table 4.2. From the table, we can see that these are the similar results to
Table 4.1. The dierence among three models is small and the battery charge
case in Exp is higher than others when r is small.
Table 4.3 presents eects of communication range of a node r on k-connected
(k = 1; 2; 3) network survivability in three cases in the approximate model
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Table 4.1: Comparison of lower and upper bounds with approximate network
survivability.
Poisson Binomial Negative Binomial
r k Lower Appro Upper Lower Appro Upper Lower Appro Upper
1 0.0000 0.2325 0.8648 0.0000 0.2402 0.8676 0.0000 0.2209 0.8604
80 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.3679 0.0000 0.0001 0.3732 0.0000 0.0000 0.3588
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0278 0.0000 0.0000 0.0286 0.0000 0.0000 0.0261
1 0.6872 0.7313 0.9757 0.6994 0.7403 0.9766 0.6696 0.7186 0.9743
90 2 0.0000 0.0746 0.8152 0.0000 0.0803 0.8200 0.0000 0.0667 0.8081
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.4167 0.0000 0.0000 0.4239 0.0000 0.0000 0.4053
1 0.9397 0.9415 0.9962 0.9432 0.9448 0.9964 0.9349 0.9369 0.9959
100 2 0.4433 0.5729 0.9651 0.4708 0.5889 0.9668 0.4044 0.5511 0.9627
3 0.0000 0.0590 0.8350 0.0000 0.0657 0.8407 0.0000 0.0506 0.8268
1 0.9848 0.9850 0.9992 0.9856 0.9857 0.9992 0.9838 0.9839 0.9991
110 2 0.8965 0.9016 0.9946 0.9041 0.9086 0.9950 0.8859 0.8921 0.9940
3 0.4085 0.5533 0.9693 0.4459 0.5744 0.9712 0.3564 0.5252 0.9666
1 0.9905 0.9906 0.9996 0.9907 0.9907 0.9996 0.9903 0.9904 0.9996
120 2 0.9776 0.9779 0.9990 0.9793 0.9795 0.9991 0.9753 0.9756 0.9989
3 0.8929 0.8984 0.9953 0.9028 0.9073 0.9957 0.8793 0.8863 0.9947
1 0.9899 0.9900 0.9996 0.9900 0.9900 0.9996 0.9899 0.9899 0.9996
130 2 0.9884 0.9884 0.9996 0.9887 0.9887 0.9996 0.9880 0.9880 0.9995
3 0.9764 0.9767 0.9991 0.9785 0.9787 0.9992 0.9736 0.9740 0.9990
for a given N = 500, where \NONE" indicates (iL);(iH)(t) = 0. We nd
that the network survivability increases as the communication range of a node
r increases, and that the MANET with battery re-charge is more survivable.
More specically, when r is small (e.g. r = 80), the network survivability for
Exp is higher than 68%, and the case with \NONE" is less than 16%. On the
other hand, even when the mean transition time for Gamma is equal to that
for Exp, there exists large dierence on the network survivability for small r.
However, when r is suciently large, the dierence among Exp, Gamma and
\NONE" is very small. Moreover, as connectivity requirement k increases, the
survivability takes a lower level when r is small. This result means that the
network survivability is more sensitive to battery re-charge with small r. In
Table 4.4, we investigate the sensitivity of the total number of nodes N on
the network survivability measures, where the transmission range r is xed as
100. Note once again that k = 1 corresponds the network reliability. From this
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Table 4.2: Comparison of three battery charge cases with approximate network
survivability.
Poisson Binomial Negative Binomial
r k Gamma EXP NONE Gamma EXP NONE Gamma EXP NONE
1 0.2325 0.6869 0.1592 0.2402 0.6964 0.1653 0.2209 0.6732 0.1500
80 2 0.0000 0.0468 0.0000 0.0001 0.0508 0.0000 0.0000 0.0413 0.0000
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 0.7313 0.9419 0.6587 0.7403 0.9453 0.6686 0.7186 0.9374 0.6445
90 2 0.0746 0.5712 0.0348 0.0803 0.5872 0.0380 0.0667 0.5495 0.0305
3 0.0000 0.0580 0.0000 0.0000 0.0646 0.0000 0.0000 0.0497 0.0000
1 0.9415 0.9875 0.9195 0.9448 0.9881 0.9237 0.9369 0.9866 0.9137
100 2 0.5729 0.9182 0.4637 0.5889 0.9243 0.4799 0.5511 0.9100 0.4415
3 0.0590 0.6098 0.0228 0.0657 0.6301 0.0259 0.0506 0.5827 0.0189
1 0.9850 0.9920 0.9807 0.9857 0.9921 0.9818 0.9839 0.9919 0.9792
110 2 0.9016 0.9838 0.8599 0.9086 0.9850 0.8689 0.8921 0.9823 0.8477
3 0.5533 0.9299 0.4282 0.5744 0.9366 0.4494 0.5252 0.9209 0.4001
1 0.9906 0.9911 0.9900 0.9907 0.9912 0.9902 0.9904 0.9911 0.9897
120 2 0.9779 0.9904 0.9695 0.9795 0.9906 0.9719 0.9756 0.9902 0.9663
3 0.8984 0.9845 0.8501 0.9073 0.9856 0.8620 0.8863 0.9829 0.8339
1 0.9900 0.9897 0.9900 0.9900 0.9897 0.9900 0.9899 0.9897 0.9899
130 2 0.9884 0.9896 0.9873 0.9887 0.9896 0.9877 0.9880 0.9896 0.9866
3 0.9767 0.9891 0.9675 0.9787 0.9893 0.9705 0.9740 0.9889 0.9633
result, it can be seen that when the number of nodes is greater than 500, the
network reliability is higher than 90%. However, once the reliability attains the
maximum value with N = 700, it decreases gradually as the number of nodes
increases. Because of increasing number of nodes, it turns out that the network
connectivity increases. However, from Table 4.4 with k = 2; 3, we come to
know that the network survivability does not show the monotone tendency on
N , similar to the network reliability. This is because the number of Blackhole
nodes increases as the total number of nodes in the whole network increases.
In Table 4.5, we focus on the network reliability (k = 1) and compare the
upper and lower bounds of network survivability in Eqs. (4.10) and (4.11) with
our approximate formula in Eq. (4.12), where the number of nodes is N = 500
and the transmission range changes from r = 80 to r = 130. In this table,
the values in \Square" and \Circular" are calculated based on Eqs. (4.28) and
(4.30), respectively. From the result, we can see that the dierence between
lower and upper bounds of network reliability is rather remarkable for some
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Table 4.3: Steady-state network survivability for varying node transmission
radius r.
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
r Gamma EXP NONE Gamma EXP NONE Gamma EXP NONE
80 0.2328 0.6867 0.1595 0.0000 0.0467 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
85 0.5023 0.8596 0.4096 0.0054 0.2599 0.0014 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000
90 0.7315 0.9419 0.6589 0.0747 0.5711 0.0349 0.0000 0.0580 0.0000
95 0.8714 0.9754 0.8281 0.2927 0.8012 0.1938 0.0032 0.2946 0.0006
100 0.9415 0.9875 0.9196 0.5732 0.9182 0.4640 0.0592 0.6096 0.0229
105 0.9725 0.9912 0.9625 0.7847 0.9665 0.7081 0.2662 0.8261 0.1603
110 0.9850 0.9920 0.9807 0.9017 0.9838 0.8600 0.5536 0.9299 0.4285
115 0.9894 0.9917 0.9877 0.9558 0.9892 0.9362 0.7757 0.9706 0.6864
120 0.9906 0.9911 0.9900 0.9779 0.9904 0.9696 0.8985 0.9845 0.8502
125 0.9905 0.9904 0.9903 0.9860 0.9902 0.9827 0.9544 0.9885 0.9321
130 0.9900 0.9897 0.9900 0.9885 0.9896 0.9873 0.9767 0.9891 0.9675
specic values on r. For example, when r = 80, the dierence between the lower
and upper bounds with/without border eects are 0.8648 (Ignorance), 0.8016
(Square) and 0.8135 (Circular). On the other hand, the approximate network
reliability always takes a value between lower and upper bounds. This result
tells us that the approximate network reliability in Eq. (4.12) is more useful
than the bounds for quantication of network reliability. Table 4.6 presents the
dependence of the number of nodes N on the steady-state network reliability
among three situations with/without border eects. From these results, it is
shown that the network reliability without border eects (Ignorance) is higher
than those with border eects (Square and Circular).
4.4.2 Transient Analysis of Network Survivability
Next we calculate the transient network survivability with the limiting probabil-
ities Pch;j(t) (j 2 fch; cl; sh; sl;mh;ml; ef; dfg) corresponding to S, by taking
the Laplace inversion of Eqs. (4.56)-(4.63) in Appendix. We apply the well-
known Abate's algorithm [45] for the numerical inversion of Laplace transforms.
Reminding these properties on transition probabilities, we set N = 500 and
r = 100, and consider the transient network survivability at time t of three
node degree models with lower and upper bounds and an approximate form.
From Table 4.7, the transient network survivability has almost the same initial
4.4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 73
Table 4.4: Steady-state network survivability for varying number of node N .
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
N Gamma EXP NONE Gamma EXP NONE Gamma EXP NONE
500 0.9415 0.9875 0.9196 0.5732 0.9182 0.4640 0.0592 0.6096 0.0229
550 0.9693 0.9903 0.9581 0.7617 0.9624 0.6789 0.2268 0.8065 0.1287
600 0.9812 0.9904 0.9756 0.8744 0.9795 0.8226 0.4652 0.9092 0.3351
650 0.9856 0.9894 0.9829 0.9335 0.9852 0.9043 0.6764 0.9554 0.5623
700 0.9865 0.9879 0.9853 0.9619 0.9864 0.9465 0.8185 0.9742 0.7393
750 0.9860 0.9862 0.9855 0.9745 0.9856 0.9667 0.8998 0.9808 0.8519
800 0.9846 0.9844 0.9845 0.9794 0.9842 0.9755 0.9421 0.9822 0.9152
850 0.9829 0.9824 0.9829 0.9806 0.9823 0.9787 0.9624 0.9816 0.9480
900 0.9810 0.9803 0.9811 0.9799 0.9802 0.9791 0.9712 0.9800 0.9638
950 0.9789 0.9780 0.9790 0.9784 0.9780 0.9781 0.9743 0.9779 0.9706
1000 0.9766 0.9757 0.9768 0.9764 0.9757 0.9764 0.9745 0.9757 0.9727
values, and the dierence between them will be remarkable as time elapses.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the transient probability of cooperate state at time t.
We can see that three cases have the similar values in the rst 500 seconds and
become dierent after that. Because three node degree models show the similar
tendency, we focus on only the Poisson model to investigate the impact on tran-
sient network survivability here. We set the total number of nodes N = 500 and
transmission radius r = 100. Then, we plot the transient network survivability
of three battery charge cases; Gamma, Exp and No charge, with lower/upper
bounds and approximate solution based on the behavior of the limiting proba-
bilities at arbitrary time t, in Fig. 4.3, Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5, respectively. From
these gures, it can be seen clearly that the lower/upper bounds and approxi-
mate solution of network survivability have almost the same initial values, and
the dierences among them also becomes remarkable as time elapses. All three
battery charge cases have a higher transient network survivability when connec-
tivity requirement k is lower. When the k becomes higher (k = 3), the transient
network survivability gets closer to 0.0624 (Gamma)/ 0.6096 (Exp)/ 0.026 (No
Charge) with time t elapsing. Finally we compare the approximate solution
of three battery charge cases in terms of the transient network survivability.
Figure 4.6 depicts the transient network survivability by varying the connectiv-
ity requirement k. It is shown that if there is no battery charge, the transient
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Figure 4.2: Transient probability of Cooperative state in three cases.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  5000  10000  15000  20000  25000  30000  35000  40000
N
et
w
or
k 
S
ur
vi
va
bi
lit
y
Time
Gamma Lower k=1
Gamma Approximate k=1
Gamma Upper k=1
Gamma Lower k=2
Gamma Approximate k=2
Gamma Upper k=2
Gamma Lower k=3
Gamma Approximate k=3
Gamma Upper k=3
Figure 4.3: Transient network survivability of Gamma case.
network survivability drops down as the operation time goes on. However, the
transient solution with battery charge (Exp) still keeps higher levels in the same
situation. This fact implies that the battery charge of node leads to an better
performance of MANETs.
4.5 Appendix
In this Appendix, we derive the steady-state probability of our SMP model.
Let 1=ij denote the mean transition time from state i to state j. Dene the
Laplace-Stieltjes transform (LST) by qij(s) =
R1
0
expf stgdQij(t). From the
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Figure 4.4: Transient network survivability of EXP case.
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Figure 4.5: Transient network survivability of No Charge case.
familiar SMP analysis technique, it is immediate to see that
qch;cl(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF ch;mh(t)F ch;sg(t)dFch;cl(t) (4.34)
qch;mh(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF ch;cl(t)F ch;sh(t)dFch;mh(t) (4.35)
qch:sh(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF ch;cl(t)F ch;mh(t)dFch;sh(t) (4.36)
qcl;ch(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF cl;ml(t)F cl:sl(t)F cl;ef (t)dFcl;ch(t) (4.37)
qcl;ml(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF cl;ch(t)F cl;sl(t)F cl;ef (t)dFcl;ml(t) (4.38)
qcl;sl(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF cl;ch(t)F cl:ml(t)F cl;ef (t)dFcl;sl(t) (4.39)
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of Approximate transient netwrok survivability.
qcl;ef (s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF cl;ch(t)F cl;ml(t)F cl;sl(t)dFcl;ef (t) (4.40)
qmh;ml(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgFmh;df (t)dFmh;ml(t) (4.41)
qmh;df (s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgFmh;ml(t)dFmh;df (t) (4.42)
qml;mh(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgFml;df (t)Fml;ef (t)dFml;mh(t) (4.43)
qml;df (s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgFml;mh(t)Fml;ef (t)dFml;df (t) (4.44)
qml;ef (s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgFml;mh(t)Fml;df (t)dFml;ef (t) (4.45)
qsh;ch(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF sh;mh(t)dFsh;ch(t) (4.46)
qsh;mh(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF sh;ch(t)dFsh;mh(t) (4.47)
qsl;sh(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF sl;cf (t)F sl;ml(t)dFsl;sh(t) (4.48)
qsl;cl(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF sl;sh(t)F sl;ml(t)dFsl;cl(t) (4.49)
qsl;ml(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgF sl;sh(t)F sl;cl(t)dFsl;ml(t) (4.50)
qdf;ch(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgdFdf;ch(t) (4.51)
qef;ch(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgdFef;ch(t); (4.52)
where in general  () = 1  (). We also dene the recurrent time distribution
from state CH to state CH and its LST by Hch;ch(t) and hch;ch(s), respectively.
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Then, from the one-step transition probabilities from Eqs. (4.34)-(4.52), we have
hch;ch(s) =
Z 1
0
expf stgdHch;ch(t)
=qch;cl(s)[qcl;ch(s) + qcl;ml(s)(qml;mh(s)qmh;df (s)
 qdf;ch(s) + qml;df (s)qdf;ch(s) + qml;ef (s)
 qef;ch(s))=k(s)) + qcl;sl(s)[qsl;sh(s)(qsh;ch(s)
+ qsh;mh(s)(qmh;df (s)qdf;ch(s) + qmh;ml(s)
 (qml;df (s)qdf;ch(s) + qml;ef (s)qef;ch(s)))=k(s))
+ qsl;ml(s)(qml;mh(s)qmh;df (s)qdf;ch(s)
+ qml;df (s)qdf;ch(s) + qml;ef (s)qef;ch(s))=k(s)]
+ qcl;ef (s)qef;ch(s)]=l(s) + qch;mh(s)[qmh;ml(s)
 (qml;df (s)qdf;ch(s) + qml;ef (s)qef;ch(s))
+ qmh;df (s)qdf;ch(s)]=k(s) + qch;sh(s)[qsh;ch(s)
+ qsh;mh(s)(qmh;ml(s)(qml;df (s)qdf;ch(s)
+ qml;ef (s)qef;ch(s)) + qmh;df (s)qdf;ch(s))=k(s)];
(4.53)
where
l(s) =1 qcl;sl(s)qsl;cl(s) (4.54)
k(s) =1 qmh;ml(s)qml;mh(s): (4.55)
Let Pch;i(t) denote the transition probability from the initial state CH to
respective states i 2 fch; cl; sh; sl;mh;ml; ef; dfg corresponding to S. Then,
the LSTs of the transition probability, pch;i =
R1
0
expf stgdPch;i(t), are given
by
pch;ch(s) =
n
qch;mh(s) qch;sh(s) qch;cl(s)
o
=hch;ch(s) (4.56)
pch;cl(s) =qch;cl(s)
n
qcl;ch(s) qcl;ml(s) qcl;sl(s)
qcl;ef (s)
o
=
n
hch;ch(s)k(s)
o
(4.57)
pch;sh(s) =
n
qch;sh(s) + qch;cl(s)qcl;sl(s)qsl;sh(s)=l(s)
o

n
qsh;mh(s) qsh;ch(s)
o
=hch;ch(s) (4.58)
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pch;sl(s) =
n
qch;cl(s)qcl;sl(s)=l(s)
on
qsl;cl(s) qsl;sh(s) qsl;ml(s)
o
=hch:ch(s)
(4.59)
pch;ml(s) =
n
qch;mh(s)qmh;ml(s) + qch;sh(s)qsh;mh(s)
 qmh;ml(s) + qch;cl(s)

qcl;ml(s) + qcl;sl(s)
[qsl;ml(s) + qsl;sh(s)qsh;mh(s)qmh;ml(s)]

=l(s)
on
qml;mh(s) qml;df (s) qml;ef (s)
o
=
n
hch;ch(s)k(s)
o
(4.60)
pch;mh(s) =
n
qch;mh(s) + qch;sh(s)qsh;mh(s) + qch;cl(s)
 qcl;ml(s)qml;mh(s) + qcl;sl(s)[qsl;ml(s)
qml;mh(s) + qsl;sh(s)qsh;mh(s)]

=l(s)
o

n
qmh;ml(s) qmh;df (s)
o
=
n
hch;ch(s)k(s)
o
: (4.61)
pch;df (s) =
n
qch;cl(s)

qcl;ml(s)(qml;mh(s)qmh;df (s)
+ qml;df (s)) + qcl;sl(s)[qsl;sh(s)qsh;mh(s)
 [qmh;df (s) + qmh;ml(s)qml;df (s)] + qsl;ml(s)
 (qml;mh(s)qmh;df (s) + qml;df (s))]

=l(s)
+ qch;sh(s)qsh;mh(s)

qmh;ml(s)qml;df (s)
+ qmh;df (s)

+ qch;mh(s)

qmh;ml(s)qml;df (s)
+qmh;df (s)
o
qdf;ch(s)=
n
hch;ch(s)k(s)
o
(4.62)
pch;ef (s) =
n
qch;mh(s)qmh;ml(s)qml;ef (s)=k(s) + qch;sh(s)
 qsh;mh(s)qmh;ml(s)qml;ef (s)=k(s) + qch;cl(s)
 qcl;ml(s)qml;ef (s)=k(s) + qcl;sl(s)[qsl;ml(s)
 qml;ef (s) + qsl;sh(s)qsh;mh(s)qmh;ml(s)
qml;ef (s)]=k(s) + qcl;ef (s)

=l(s)
o
qef;ch(s)=hch;ch(s): (4.63)
From Eqs. (4.56)-(4.63), the transient solutions, Pch;i(t), i 2 fch; cl; sh; sl;mh;
ml; ef; dfg, which mean the probability that the state travels in another state i
at time t, can be derived numerically, by means of the Laplace inversion tech-
nique (e.g. see [45]). As a special case, it is easy to derive the steady-state
probability Pi = limt!1 Pch;i(t); i 2 fch; cl; sh; sl;mh;ml; ef; dfg correspond-
ing to S. Based on the LSTs, pch;i(s), we can obtain Pi = limt!1 Pch;i(t) =
lims!0 pch;i(s) from Eqs. (4.56)-(4.63).
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Table 4.5: Steady-state network reliability for node transmission radius r
with/without border eects in case(1).
Ignorance
r Approximate Lower Bound Upper Bound
80 0.2328 0.0000 0.8648
85 0.5023 0.3114 0.9410
90 0.7315 0.6872 0.9757
95 0.8714 0.8622 0.9903
100 0.9415 0.9397 0.9962
105 0.9725 0.9721 0.9984
110 0.9850 0.9848 0.9992
115 0.9894 0.9893 0.9995
120 0.9906 0.9905 0.9996
125 0.9905 0.9905 0.9996
130 0.9900 0.9899 0.9996
Square
r Approximate Lower Bound Upper Bound
80 0.1087 0.0000 0.8016
85 0.3209 0.0000 0.9045
90 0.5692 0.4362 0.9566
95 0.7622 0.7283 0.9810
100 0.8796 0.8716 0.9919
105 0.9412 0.9393 0.9965
110 0.9704 0.9699 0.9984
115 0.9833 0.9831 0.9992
120 0.9885 0.9884 0.9995
125 0.9903 0.9902 0.9996
130 0.9906 0.9906 0.9996
Circular
r Approximate Lower Bound Upper Bound
80 0.1261 0.0000 0.8135
85 0.3509 0.0000 0.9117
90 0.5991 0.4875 0.9605
95 0.7840 0.7565 0.9829
100 0.8928 0.8865 0.9928
105 0.9482 0.9467 0.9969
110 0.9739 0.9735 0.9986
115 0.9848 0.9847 0.9993
120 0.9891 0.9890 0.9995
125 0.9905 0.9904 0.9996
130 0.9906 0.9905 0.9996
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Table 4.6: Steady-state network reliability for varying number of node N
with/without border eects in case(1).
Ignorance
N Approximate Lower Bound Upper Bound
500 0.9415 0.9397 0.9962
550 0.9693 0.9688 0.9982
600 0.9812 0.9810 0.9990
650 0.9856 0.9854 0.9993
700 0.9865 0.9864 0.9994
750 0.9860 0.9859 0.9994
800 0.9846 0.9845 0.9994
850 0.9829 0.9828 0.9994
900 0.9810 0.9808 0.9993
950 0.9789 0.9787 0.9993
1000 0.9766 0.9764 0.9992
Square
N Approximate Lower Bound Upper Bound
500 0.8796 0.8716 0.9919
550 0.9367 0.9346 0.9962
600 0.9649 0.9642 0.9981
650 0.9779 0.9777 0.9989
700 0.9834 0.9833 0.9992
750 0.9851 0.9850 0.9994
800 0.9850 0.9849 0.9994
850 0.9840 0.9838 0.9994
900 0.9824 0.9823 0.9994
950 0.9806 0.9805 0.9993
1000 0.9787 0.9784 0.9993
Circular
N Approximate Lower Bound Upper Bound
500 0.8928 0.8865 0.9928
550 0.9439 0.9423 0.9967
600 0.9687 0.9682 0.9983
650 0.9798 0.9796 0.9990
700 0.9843 0.9841 0.9993
750 0.9854 0.9853 0.9994
800 0.9850 0.9849 0.9994
850 0.9839 0.9837 0.9994
900 0.9822 0.9821 0.9994
950 0.9804 0.9802 0.9993
1000 0.9783 0.9781 0.9993
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Table 4.7: Transient network survivability with three stochastic models.
Poisson Binomial Negative Binomial
t k Lower Appro Upper Lower Appro Upper Lower Appro Upper
1 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000
0 2 0.9987 0.9987 0.9999 0.9990 0.9990 0.9999 0.9984 0.9984 0.9999
3 0.9894 0.9895 0.9993 0.9911 0.9911 0.9994 0.9872 0.9873 0.9992
1 0.9888 0.9888 0.9993 0.9893 0.9894 0.9993 0.9880 0.9881 0.9992
4000 2 0.9307 0.9330 0.9956 0.9362 0.9382 0.9959 0.9231 0.9260 0.9951
3 0.5965 0.6679 0.9746 0.6248 0.6871 0.9764 0.5577 0.6424 0.9722
1 0.9808 0.9810 0.9988 0.9820 0.9821 0.9989 0.9792 0.9795 0.9987
8000 2 0.8425 0.8542 0.9900 0.8533 0.8635 0.9907 0.8276 0.8416 0.9891
3 0.1129 0.4115 0.9450 0.1627 0.4326 0.9480 0.0434 0.3838 0.9408
1 0.9708 0.9712 0.9981 0.9726 0.9730 0.9983 0.9683 0.9688 0.9980
12000 2 0.7392 0.7704 0.9835 0.7550 0.7827 0.9845 0.7171 0.7536 0.9821
3 0.0000 0.2422 0.9136 0.0000 0.2593 0.9176 0.0000 0.2198 0.9080
1 0.9614 0.9621 0.9975 0.9637 0.9644 0.9977 0.9581 0.9590 0.9973
16000 2 0.6466 0.7022 0.9777 0.6664 0.7163 0.9790 0.6188 0.6829 0.9760
3 0.0000 0.1536 0.8875 0.0000 0.1667 0.8921 0.0000 0.1365 0.8808
1 0.9540 0.9550 0.9971 0.9567 0.9577 0.9972 0.9502 0.9514 0.9968
20000 2 0.5759 0.6542 0.9733 0.5986 0.6692 0.9747 0.5441 0.6337 0.9714
3 0.0000 0.1095 0.8685 0.0000 0.1200 0.8736 0.0000 0.0960 0.8613

Chapter 5
A Simulation Approach to
Quantify Network
Survivability for MANETs
The network survivability is an emerging requirement for highly reliable commu-
nication services in MANETs and is dened as the probability that the network
can keep to be connected even under node failures and DoS attacks. Although
some analytical formulas on the quantitative network survivability have been
proposed, they have not been validated yet by comparing with the exact value
of network survivability in a comprehensive way. In this chapter, we revisit
the existing lower and upper bounds of network survivability by taking account
of border eects in a network communication area and develop a simulation
model. It is shown through simulation experiments that the analytical solutions
often fail in the exact network survivability measurement.
5.1 Simulation Algorithms
For our SMP modulated network survivability model in Chapter 2, it is needed
to quantify the network survivability throughout Monte Calro simulation, be-
cause the analytical solutions (upper and lower bounds) may not be validated
without knowing the exact solution. Unfortunately, the simulation approach
mentioned in Xing and Wang [12] is oversimplied and does not seem to catch
up impacts of both node misbehavior and node failure accurately. Once the
shape of communication area, such as a square area, is given, a xed number of
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Set Node and Nodei to empty;
Set N to the total number of node in the MANET;
Set L to the side length of square area;
For (i = 0; i  N ; i++) f
Set x and y to 0;
Randomly generate (x; y) (x; y 2 [0; L])
for Nodei (i 2 [0; N ]);
Add Nodei to Node;g
/*Nodei is the i-th element of Node*/
Figure 5.1: A node location algorithm for square areas.
nodes are uniformly distributed to the area. A commonly used technique for a
square communication area is to locate points randomly with abscissa x and or-
dinate y for each node (x; y) in a Cartesian coordinate system. We generate the
random numbers for x and y, which are sampled from the continuous uniform
distribution with lower and upper endpoints at 0 and 1, respectively, where the
side length of communication area is given by L. In our simulation, we never
take account of eects of the speed and destination of moving nodes, to simplify
the simulation procedure, although this is because we employ the SMP modu-
lated network survivability model. Figure 5.1 presents a pseudo code to give the
node location for a square area. Here, we suppose that a circle area can be ap-
proximated by the sum of innitesimal triangles, BCD, where the point C is at
the origin, and the points B and D are located on the circumference. Since the
sum of two triangles BCD is equivalent to the area of a parallelogram BCDE,
then we can apply the similar algorithm to Fig. 5.1. Figure 5.2 is a pseudo code
to give the node location for circular areas. For a circular communication area
with radius R, we randomly choose two points on BC and CD. Let a and b be
the distances between origin and these chosen points on BC and CD. Then let z
equal to 2R (a+b) if a+b > R, otherwise a+b. We can select one of triangles
BCD by picking an angle  2 [0; 2), so the random points in a circular area
with abscissa x and ordinate y can be calculated as (x; y) = (z cos; z sin).
In this way, when each node is located over a 2-dimensional area, the next
step is to modulate each node state by an SMP. If we focus on the steady-state
behavior of MANETs, then the steady-state probability Pi; i 2 fc; s; b; j; fg
can be used. In our simulation experiments, we generate the node state with
probability Pi uniformly, where the unit length,
P5
i=1 Pi = 1, is divided by 5
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Set Node and Nodei to empty;
Set N to the total number of node in the MANET;
Set R to the radius of circular area;
For (i = 0; i  N ; i++) f
Set ; a; b; z; x and y to 0;
Randomly generate  ( 2 [0; 2));
Randomly generate a and b (a; b 2 [0; R]);
if a+ b > R then z = 2R  (a+ b),
otherwise z = a+ b;
calculate (x; y) by:
x = z cos;
y = z sin;
for Nodei (i 2 [0; N ]);
Add Nodei to Node;g
/*Nodei is the i-th element of Node*/
Figure 5.2: A node location algorithm for circular areas.
portions proportional to Pi. Let Ni; i 2 fc; s; j; s; fg be the number of nodes
in state i in the network. If NB 6= 0, then the minimum cooperative degree of
network M, is given by (M) = 0, otherwise, divide the active nodes into two
state groups; Cooperative nodes and Selsh/Jellysh nodes, and calculate the
(M) of an arbitrary node in a MANET M. For a given transmission radius r
and the number of node N , we generate the node location 100 times and make
100 state transitions for each node. Finally, we execute 10,000 simulation runs to
represent the node location and state for a xed size of networks, say, N . Then
the connectivity-based network survivability in our simulation experiments is
calculated by
SV Bk(M) =
P10;000
i=1 IfAig
10; 000
; (5.1)
where Ai indicates the event (M)  k at i-th simulation and IfAg is the
indicator function to output 1 or 0 for occurrence of the event A.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate simulated examples of network topology in
square and circular areas, respectively, where small points denote Cooperative
nodes and can be used to transmission, and larger points denote Jellsh and
Selsh nodes which initiate the transmission. Counting the number of coopera-
tive neighbors for all active nodes, we can nd the minimum cooperative degree
(M). An algorithm to change the state of each node and to nd the minimum
cooperative degree is given in Fig. 5.5. Let Node and Nodei be the sequence
of node in a MANET and i-th element of Node. Also let NodeC, NodeSJ
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Figure 5.3: Network topology used in simulation (square area).
and NodeB denote the subsets of sequence Node with Cooperative node, Self-
ish/Jellsh node and Blackhole node, respectively. For each Nodei, we choose
a value v randomly from 0 to 1, and identify the state j (2 C; S; J;B; F ). If the
subset NodeB is not empty, then the minimum cooperative degree (M) equals
to 0, otherwise, we need to count the number of cooperative neighbors of each
node in subsets NodeC and NodeSJ . For a given transmission radius r, we cal-
culate the distance of each element between NodeSJ and NodeC. Besides, we
also calculate the distance of each element in NodeC. If the distance of a node
pair is not greater than r, then they are considered as neighbors. After counting
the number of cooperative neighbors for all node in NodeC and NodeSJ , we
can nd the minimum cooperative degree (M).
To our best knowledge, the simulator developed here is a unique tool to quan-
tify the connectivity-based network survivability with higher accuracy. However,
as well known, the computation cost to seek the survivability measure is trouble-
some and very expensive. In other words, it is quite hard to simulate the node
behavior and calculate the network survivability in on-line procedure. Hence,
the analytical solution is still valuable to measure the connectivity-based net-
work survivability in real MANETs.
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Figure 5.4: Network topology used in simulation (circular area).
5.2 Numerical Examples
In the numerical experiments, we set up the following model parameters [12]:
c;s = 1=240:0 [1/sec]; c;j = 3=2.0e+7 [1/sec];
c;b = 1=6.0e+7 [1/sec]; c;f = 1=500:0 [1/sec];
s;c = 1=60:0 [1/sec]; s;j = 3=2.0e+7 [1/sec];
s;b = 1=6.0e+7 [1/sec]; s;f = 1=500:0 [1/sec];
j;f = 1=50:0 [1/sec]; b;f = 1=50:0 [1/sec];
j;f = 1=60:0 [1/sec];
where ij are transition rates from state i to state j in the exponential distribu-
tions. Under the above model parameters, the node probabilities in the steady
state are given by
Pc = 0:7299; Ps = 0:1629; Pj = 6:696e-6;
Pb = 7:44e-7; Pf = 0:1072:
We also assume the network parameters as follows:
 A = 1000 (m) 1000 (m): the area of MANET.
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Set PC ; PS ; PJ ; PB ; PF to the steay state
probability of each state;
Set NodeC; NodeSJ; NodeB; (Ma) to empty;
For (i = 0; i  N ; i++)f
Set v to 0;
Randomly generate j (j 2 [0; 1]);
if 0  v < PC then add Nodei to NodeC;
if PC  v < PC + PS + PJ
then add Nodei to NodeSJ;
if PC + PS + PJ  v < PC + PS + PJ + PB
then add Nodei to NodeB;g
/*NodeC; NodeSJ; NodeB are the set of nodes
in the states C; S and J; B, respectively*/
if NodeB is not empty then add 0 to (Ma),
else Set NoC; NoSJ to the number of elements
of NodeC and NodeSJ, respectively;
Set r to the transmission radius;
Set degree to empty;
For (i = 0; i  NoSJ ; i++)f
Set count = 0;/*count the number of
cooperative neighbor*/
For (j = 0; j  NoC; j ++)f
if distance between NodeSJi and
NodeCj is no greater than r,
count++;g
Add count to degree;g;
For (i = 0; i  NoC; i++)f
Set count = 0;
For (j = 0; j  NoC; j ++)f
if i 6= j and distance between NodeCi and
NodeCj is no greater than r,
count++;g
Add count to degree;g;
Add minfdegreeg to (Ma);/*minfdegreeg
is the smallest element of degree*/
Figure 5.5: An algorithm to nd the minimum cooperative degree.
 N = 500: the number of mobile nodes.
We have already shown in Table 2.3 that our analytical models with bor-
der eects provide relatively nice performance comparing with the simulation
solutions in terms of the number of neighbors. Here, we compare the network
survivability in analytical models with the simulation results. As analytical
solutions, we calculate the expected network survivability and its associated
bounds in two cases with/without border eects. Suppose that the number of
nodes N equals to 500 for varying transition radius r from 80 to 130 by 5.
Since the network survivability depends on the connectivity level k, we set
k = 1; 2; 3 in the simulation experiments. In Tables 5.1 and 5.2 the steady-state
network survivability for varying node transmission radius r in square and cir-
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cular areas are calculated. It can be seen that the simulation result is two-sided
bounded in a few cases with (k; r) = (1; 125); (1; 130); (2; 80); (2; 85); (2; 90);
(3; 80); (3; 85); (3; 90); (3; 95); (3; 100).
Looking at the expected network survivability, it takes rather dierent val-
ues from the simulation results. In Tables 5.3 and 5.4, we compare our ana-
lytical solutions with the simulated ones for varying N . In the combination
of (k;N) = (1; 800); (1; 900); (1; 1000); (2; 1000); (3; 500), it is shown that the
simulation result is two-sided bounded, but the expected network survivability
does not always take the closed values to simulation results. When `Ignorance'
is compared with \Square' or `Circular', the latter can takes the closer value
than the former, but fails to get the satisfactory approximate performance. In
other words, our analytical models taking account of border eects still fail to
evaluate the accurate network survivability except in very few cases. This neg-
ative observation implies that there is no satisfactory analytical model to assess
the connectivity-based network survivability and that it is a challenging issue
to develop a more sophisticated stochastic model to evaluate it. The lesson
learned from the comparative study in this chapter will motivate to investigate
the other stochastic modeling approach for the purpose.
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Table 5.1: Steady-state network survivability for varying node transmission
radius r in square area.
k = 1 Ignorance Square
r Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
80 0.3522 0.5268 [0.3595, 0.9311] 0.3557 [0:0000; 0:8920]
85 0.5365 0.7459 [0.7227, 0.9730] 0.6054 [0:5149; 0:9532]
90 0.7071 0.8908 [0.8844, 0.9899] 0.7891 [0.7780, 0.9806]
95 0.7964 0.9547 [0.9524, 0.9962] 0.8952 [0.9009, 0.9922]
100 0.8867 0.9796 [0.9793, 0.9985] 0.9481 [0.9558, 0.9969]
105 0.9451 0.9928 [0.9893, 0.9993] 0.9721 [0.9792, 0.9987]
110 0.9532 0.9925 [0.9925, 0.9996] 0.9821 [0.9886, 0.9993]
115 0.9632 0.9973 [0.9933, 0.9996] 0.9859 [0.9921, 0.9996]
120 0.9854 0.9931 [0.9931, 0.9997] 0.9872 [0.9932, 0.9997]
125 0.9943 0.9931 [0:9927; 0:9997] 0.9873 [0:9932; 0:9997]
130 0.9963 0.9921 [0:9921; 0:9997] 0.9871 [0:9929; 0:9997]
k = 2 Ignorance Square
r Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
80 0.0019 0.0079 [0:0000; 0:5830] 0.0014 [0:0000; 0:4436]
85 0.0279 0.1073 [0:0000; 0:7962] 0.0283 [0:0000; 0:6877]
90 0.1335 0.3519 [0:0000; 0:9122] 0.1577 [0:0000; 0:8466]
95 0.2744 0.6249 [0.5515, 0.9652] 0.3997 [0:0959; 0:9310]
100 0.4286 0.8316 [0.8156, 0.9869] 0.6453 [0.5835, 0.9707]
105 0.6579 0.9271 [0.9260, 0.9952] 0.8158 [0.8143, 0.9881]
110 0.7492 0.9699 [0.9694, 0.9982] 0.9098 [0.9185, 0.9952]
115 0.8078 0.9882 [0.9853, 0.9992] 0.9549 [0.9635, 0.9980]
120 0.8767 0.9906 [0.9905, 0.9995] 0.9745 [0.9820, 0.9991]
125 0.9378 0.9958 [0.9919, 0.9996] 0.9824 [0.9890, 0.9995]
130 0.9606 0.9919 [0.9919, 0.9997] 0.9852 [0.9914, 0.9996]
k = 3 Ignorance Square
r Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
80 0.0000 0.0000 [0:0000; 0:1219] 0.0000 [0:0000; 0:0498]
85 0.0000 0.0002 [0:0000; 0:3762] 0.0000 [0:0000; 0:2213]
90 0.0012 0.0073 [0:0000; 0:6487] 0.0008 [0:0000; 0:4811]
95 0.0121 0.1108 [0:0000; 0:8334] 0.0195 [0:0000; 0:7104]
100 0.0538 0.3593 [0:0000; 0:9296] 0.1265 [0:0000; 0:8574]
105 0.2062 0.6336 [0.5693, 0.9725] 0.3545 [0:0000; 0:9355]
110 0.3367 0.8406 [0.8264, 0.9898] 0.6074 [0.5270, 0.9725]
115 0.4664 0.9408 [0.9313, 0.9963] 0.7927 [0.7898, 0.9887]
120 0.5940 0.9717 [0.9713, 0.9986] 0.8981 [0.9082, 0.9955]
125 0.7363 0.9882 [0.9854, 0.9993] 0.9492 [0.9590, 0.9981]
130 0.8174 0.9899 [0.9898, 0.9996] 0.9717 [0.9797, 0.9991]
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Table 5.2: Steady-state network survivability for varying node transmission
radius r in circular area.
k = 1 Ignorance Circular
r Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
80 0.3852 0.5268 [0:3595; 0:9311] 0.3831 [0:0516; 0:8996]
85 0.6175 0.7459 [0.7227, 0.9730] 0.6315 [0:5572; 0:9572]
90 0.7735 0.8908 [0.8844, 0.9899] 0.8072 [0.8004, 0.9826]
95 0.8437 0.9547 [0.9524, 0.9962] 0.9057 [0.9121, 0.9931]
100 0.9301 0.9796 [0.9793, 0.9985] 0.9535 [0.9611, 0.9972]
105 0.9542 0.9928 [0.9893, 0.9993] 0.9746 [0.9816, 0.9988]
110 0.9793 0.9925 [0.9925, 0.9996] 0.9832 [0.9896, 0.9994]
115 0.9920 0.9973 [0.9933, 0.9996] 0.9863 [0.9925, 0.9996]
120 0.9937 0.9931 [0:9931; 0:9997] 0.9873 [0:9932; 0:9997]
125 0.9970 0.9931 [0:9927; 0:9997] 0.9873 [0:9932; 0:9997]
130 0.9989 0.9921 [0:9921; 0:9997] 0.9870 [0:9928; 0:9997]
k = 2 Ignorance Circular
r Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
80 0.0052 0.0079 [0:0000; 0:5830] 0.0020 [0:0000; 0:4676]
85 0.0422 0.1073 [0:0000; 0:7962] 0.0367 [0:0000; 0:7079]
90 0.1755 0.3519 [0:0000; 0:9122] 0.1850 [0:0000; 0:8596]
95 0.3392 0.6249 [0.5515, 0.9652] 0.4385 [0:1916; 0:9381]
100 0.5507 0.8316 [0.8156, 0.9869] 0.6789 [0.6341, 0.9742]
105 0.6825 0.9271 [0.9260, 0.9952] 0.8375 [0.8396, 0.9897]
110 0.8191 0.9699 [0.9694, 0.9982] 0.9216 [0.9306, 0.9959]
115 0.9169 0.9882 [0.9853, 0.9992] 0.9606 [0.9690, 0.9983]
120 0.9497 0.9906 [0.9905, 0.9995] 0.9771 [0.9842, 0.9992]
125 0.9706 0.9858 [0.9919, 0.9996] 0.9834 [0.9899, 0.9995]
130 0.9824 0.9919 [0.9919, 0.9997] 0.9856 [0.9917, 0.9996]
k = 3 Ignorance Circular
r Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
80 0.0000 0.0000 [0:0000; 0:1219] 0.0000 [0:0000; 0:0590]
85 0.0000 0.0002 [0:0000; 0:3762] 0.0000 [0:0000; 0:2451]
90 0.0019 0.0073 [0:0000; 0:6487] 0.0013 [0:0000; 0:5104]
95 0.0223 0.1108 [0:0000; 0:8334] 0.0276 [0:0000; 0:7339]
100 0.1035 0.3593 [0:0000; 0:9296] 0.1567 [0:0000; 0:8722]
105 0.2500 0.6336 [0.5693, 0.9725] 0.4016 [0:1016; 0:9435]
110 0.4206 0.8406 [0.8264, 0.9898] 0.6503 [0.5954, 0.9764]
115 0.6730 0.9408 [0.9313, 0.9963] 0.8212 [0.8236, 0.9905]
120 0.7696 0.9717 [0.9713, 0.9986] 0.9136 [0.9240, 0.9962]
125 0.8414 0.9882 [0.9854, 0.9993] 0.9568 [0.9660, 0.9985]
130 0.8967 0.9899 [0.9898, 0.9996] 0.9750 [0.9826, 0.9993]
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Table 5.3: Steady-state network survivability for varying number of node N in
square area.
k = 1 Ignorance Square
N Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
500 0.9065 0.9787 [0.9793, 0.9985] 0.9549 [0.9611, 0.9972]
600 0.9715 0.9909 [0.9908, 0.9995] 0.9865 [0.9876, 0.9993]
700 0.9853 0.9905 [0.9905, 0.9995] 0.9904 [0.9905, 0.9995]
800 0.9960 0.9881 [0:9880; 0:9995] 0.9890 [0:9888; 0:9995]
900 0.9987 0.9850 [0:9849; 0:9994] 0.9863 [0:9860; 0:9994]
1000 0.9988 0.9815 [0:9814; 0:9993] 0.9832 [0:9828; 0:9994]
k = 2 Ignorance Square
N Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
500 0.5231 0.8249 [0.8156, 0.9869] 0.6473 [0.6341, 0.9742]
600 0.8055 0.9611 [0.9604, 0.9976] 0.9078 [0.9166, 0.9951]
700 0.9027 0.9853 [0.9851, 0.9992] 0.9732 [0.9759, 0.9988]
800 0.9569 0.9872 [0.9871, 0.9994] 0.9855 [0.9859, 0.9994]
900 0.9872 0.9849 [0:9848; 0:9994] 0.9856 [0:9855; 0:9994]
1000 0.9960 0.9815 [0:9813; 0:9993] 0.9830 [0:9827; 0:9994]
k = 3 Ignorance Square
N Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
500 0.0910 0.3435 [0:0000; 0:9296] 0.1052 [0:0000; 0:8722]
600 0.4031 0.7971 [0.7734, 0.9866] 0.5700 [0.5138, 0.9715]
700 0.6545 0.9482 [0.9468, 0.9973] 0.8680 [0.8796, 0.9939]
800 0.8189 0.9799 [0.9797, 0.9991] 0.9597 [0.9643, 0.9984]
900 0.9351 0.9835 [0.9834, 0.9993] 0.9799 [0.9808, 0.9992]
1000 0.9758 0.9813 [0.9811, 0.9993] 0.9818 [0.9817, 0.9993]
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Table 5.4: Steady-state network survivability for varying number of node N in
circular area.
k = 1 Ignorance Circular
N Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
500 0.8599 0.9787 [0.9793, 0.9985] 0.9602 [0.9558, 0.9969]
600 0.9536 0.9909 [0.9908, 0.9995] 0.9876 [0.9865, 0.9992]
700 0.9775 0.9905 [0.9905, 0.9995] 0.9905 [0.9903, 0.9995]
800 0.9912 0.9881 [0:9880; 0:9995] 0.9889 [0:9889; 0:9995]
900 0.9974 0.9850 [0:9849; 0:9994] 0.9861 [0:9862; 0:9995]
1000 0.9988 0.9815 [0:9814; 0:9993] 0.9829 [0:9830; 0:9994]
k = 2 Ignorance Circular
N Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
500 0.3888 0.8249 [0.8156, 0.9869] 0.6824 [0.5835, 0.9707]
600 0.7211 0.9611 [0.9604, 0.9976] 0.9200 [0.9034, 0.9943]
700 0.8404 0.9853 [0.9851, 0.9992] 0.9762 [0.9728, 0.9986]
800 0.9148 0.9872 [0.9871, 0.9994] 0.9860 [0.9854, 0.9993]
900 0.9739 0.9849 [0.9848, 0.9994] 0.9856 [0.9855, 0.9994]
1000 0.9862 0.9815 [0:9813; 0:9993] 0.9828 [0:9829; 0:9994]
k = 3 Ignorance Circular
N Simulation Expected Bounds Expected Bounds
500 0.0464 0.3435 [0:0000; 0:9296] 0.1350 [0:0000; 0:8574]
600 0.3154 0.7971 [0.7734, 0.9866] 0.6147 [0.4386, 0.9672]
700 0.5176 0.9482 [0.9468, 0.9973] 0.8866 [0.8584, 0.9928]
800 0.6979 0.9799 [0.9797, 0.9991] 0.9649 [0.9589, 0.9982]
900 0.8770 0.9835 [0.9834, 0.9993] 0.9810 [0.9797, 0.9992]
1000 0.9263 0.9813 [0.9811, 0.9993] 0.9819 [0.9817, 0.9993]

Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary and Remarks
In Chapter 2, we have rened the network survivability models by taking ac-
count of border eects in both square and circular areas. Based on the denition
of border eects in communication areas, we have calculated the expected cov-
erage of node in MANETs which resulted the expected node degree, and have
formulated the network survivability with border eects. In numerical experi-
ments, we have calculated the expected node degree and the connectivity-based
network survivability measures in both analytical and simulation models, and
shown that the border eects were signicant to evaluate the number of neigh-
bors accurately. We have also compared the steady-state network survivability
and the transient network survivability in three stochastic models, and shown
numerically that the network survivability was reduced ercely as k increased
when N was small and that the connectivity-based network survivability with-
out border eects was higher than that without border eects.
In Chapter 3, We havee pointed out that the CTMC model for the node
behavior in past was too simple to describe the eect of energy consumption on
the network survivability. Therefore, we have revisited the network survivability
modeling for the power-aware MANET by using MRGP modeling. By modeling
the battery life as non-exponential distributions, the MRGP model can describe
the detailed behavior of a node, compared to the simple CTMC model in [19].
Also, by applying PH expansion technique, we have performed the transient
analysis of network survivability. However, the model presented in Chapter 3
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was not compared with simulation results to validate it. This will be done as a
future work.
In Chapter 4, we have revisited the network survivability models in MANETs
by taking account of the battery re-charge and border eects in both square and
circular communication areas. Getting idea from the network connectivity, we
have presented the approximate network survivability formulae by calculating
the probability that all expected number of active nodes in the MANET is k.
In numerical experiments, we have considered two cases where the transition
time from lower battery states to fully charged battery states were given by
the gamma and exponential distributions. We have also compared the steady-
state network survivability with/without battery re-charge. It has been shown
numerically that the network survivability with battery re-charge was higher
than that with no battery charge, when r was small, and that the approximate
network reliability always took a middle value between the lower and upper
bounds.
In Chapter 5, we have developed a simulation model to quantify the network
survivability. In numerical experiments, we have shown that in the comparison
of connectivity-based network survivability, both the analytical bounds and the
expected network survivability did poorly worked except in a few cases, although
it has been shown that the border eects were still signicant to evaluate the
number of neighbors accurately when the transmission radius r changed.
6.2 Future Works
In this study, the network survivability has been dened by the minimum co-
operative degree, but it is worth mentioning that it can be considered as an
approximate measure. In future, we will develop a comprehensive network sur-
vivability model and investigate whether the approximate method for network
survivability itself can work well in several random network environments. Also,
the simulation model to calculate the exact network survivability dependent of
all the possible number of communication paths should be developed.
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